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Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is
manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is
great. History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant
to endure.... [W] hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacri-
ficed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come
to regret it.'
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: The arresting officer in a prosecu-
tion for sale of a controlled substance testifies that he observed the
defendant behaving in a manner consistent with narco-trafficking.
The officer is qualified to render such an observation as an expert
based on his training and years of experience investigating narcotics
crimes. The only element of the crime not yet established is that the
white powder seized from the defendant was in fact a controlled sub-
stance regulated by law. When the prosecutor asks the officer: "In
your opinion, what is that white powder?," the defense objects: 'Your
honor, not even a trained chemist can identify the chemical compo-
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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sition of a white power simply by looking at it." According to a recent
line of appellate cases from around the country, the objection will be
overruled. The officer will be qualified by the court as an expert in
visually identifying white powdered narcotic substances because he
had testified to participating in hundreds of arrests and because of
his ability to "pick out cocaine from a line-up of various powdery sub-
stances. 2  The officer's opinion may be admitted as the only evi-
dence that the substance is indeed a controlled substance, and on
that basis the defendant can be convicted.
This developing rule has been fostered by systemic pressures on
the criminal justice system resulting from heightened drug enforce-
ment activity, and the state of confusion surrounding the admissibil-
ity of opinion testimony. National drug enforcement policy s accu-
rately called a "drug war,"4 has treated narcotics enforcement as a
matter of national security requiring emergency measures. The crisis
mentality with which the drug war has been waged is changing the
face of criminal justice in the United States by both straining re-
sources and serving as a justification for the dilution of traditional
procedures of law enforcement and criminal prosecution.
The rules of evidence have likewise undergone a significant trans-
formation, particularly with respect to the admissibility of opinion
testimony. The common law opinion rule regarding lay and expert
witnesses has been replaced by the more flexible, lenient approach of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in most states as well as the federal
courts. With this transformation has come some uncertainty about
when opinion testimony is admissible. The confusion has given some
courts the opportunity to discard the traditional requirements of re-
liability of expert opinion testimony, notably in the area of narcotics
identification.
It should be of little surprise that evidentiary standards have
eroded in the context of criminal narcotics prosecutions. Under the
systemic pressures of the drug war,5 courts may be tempted to dimin-
ish traditional evidentiary standards and principles. There is little
2. See State v. Nelson, 480 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (allowing investigating
police officer to testify as expert on nature of allegedly controlled substances).
3. On March 21, 1972, Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States to focus
comprehensive resources of the Federal Government to combat drug abuse. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 1102 (1994) (setting forth federal government's intention to use effectively financial re-
sources to aid states and local communities in their fight against drugs).
4. See id. §§ 1101-1102 (explaining drug abuse in United States that now afflicts urban,
suburban, and rural areas of the nation requires intervention through law enforcement ef-
forts); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)
(" [DJ rug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting society today.").
5. See infra Part IV.
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doubt that the perceived exigencies of the drug war impact eviden-
tiary decisions in narcotics prosecutions. Consequently, the flexible
standards of admissibility incident to the modem rules of evidence
on opinion testimony have been most egregiously stretched in nar-
cotics cases.
This Article contends that admitting police officer/expert witness
testimony concerning the identity of a controlled substance based
solely on the officer's visual inspection of the substance violates not
only the rules of evidence and the defendant's constitutional right to
due process, but common sense reasoning as well. Part I explores
the recent line of cases allowing police officers to offer expert opin-
ion testimony based on visual identification of suspected narcotics,
and concludes that such testimony is without foundation and is in-
admissible even under the modem, flexible approach reflected in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Part II explains why these cases are erroneous. First, as a scientific
matter, it is impossible to identify the chemical composition of white
powders by sight. Second, both Congress and virtually all state legis-
latures have recognized this fact by criminalizing the sale of imitation
controlled substances. 6 In so doing, they implicitly acknowledge that
the sale of phony drugs is sufficiently common to warrant judicial in-
tervention, and that even users who have an extremely high incentive
to make sure they are buying genuine narcotics cannot identify drugs
by sight.
Part III provides an overview of the common law and Federal Rules
of Evidence regarding opinion testimony, and examines how con-
trolled substances have traditionally been identified in criminal nar-
cotics prosecutions through opinion testimony. While various meth-
ods have been employed, courts have rejected those which are
unreliable. Thus, because police visual identification of white pow-
der narcotics is inherently unreliable opinion testimony, it is inad-
missible under the rules of evidence. Part IV offers a hypothesis to
explain why the traditional rule is disintegrating in this context,
namely, the impact of the War on Drugs on the judicial system. Part
IV provides an overview of the drug war and its systemic impact on
the criminal justice system. Part IV concludes by arguing that courts
should resist the temptation to compromise the rules of evidence in
this context.
6. Imitation substances are also sometimes called "look-alike" drugs or "beat" drugs. See
People v. Jones, 675 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1996) (defining pseudo-narcotics as"look-alike" sub-
stances); People v.Job, 630 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that upon defendant's
arrest, police recovered one vial of "beat" drugs).
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I. VISUAL IDENTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Until recently, most courts agreed that proof of the identity of a
suspected controlled substance could not rest on an opinion based
solely on visual inspection. Courts reasoned that it was impossible to
ascertain the chemical composition of a substance just by looking at
it. In the past decade or so, however, a growing number of appellate
courts have held or suggested that an opinion based on visual inspec-
tion is admissible and sufficient to prove the identity of the sub-
stance.
A. The Traditional Rule
Traditionally, courts have held that neither a police officer nor any
other expert may offer an opinion at trial that a particular substance
is a narcotic based solely on visual inspection. Justices William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall wrote in United States v. Jacobson8
that "[u]pon visual inspection of the powder [at issue] in isolation,
one could not identify it as cocaine,"9 recognizing the difficulty of
analyzing a substance just by looking at it. The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas offered a similar explanation for adopting a rule
prohibiting visual identification:
[W] e are unwilling to say that an experienced officer can look at a
white or brown powdered substance and testify that it is heroin
since morphine, codeine, paregoric, other opiates, other con-
trolled substances, and non-controlled substances also appear in
white or brown powdered form. A green leafy plant substance
which is marijuana has different characteristics from other green
leafy plant substances; an expert can determine the difference.
The evidence here does not show that even the experienced expert
can distinguish one white or brownish powdered substance from
another and determine which one is heroin.°
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reversed a conspiracy conviction for
failure to prove that the substance at issue was a narcotic, taking judi-
cial notice that "whether or not a powder or substance is a narcotic
cannot be determined by a mere inspection of its outward appear-
ance."" Given the difficulty of distinguishing one indescript pow-
dered substance from another, virtually all courts seemed to agree
that neither police officers nor other experts may offer such identifi-
7. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
8. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
9. Id. at 142 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
10. Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
11. Cook v. United States, 362 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1966).
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cation testimony.
12
B. The Developing Rule
The general prohibition on visual identification of controlled sub-
stances began to disintegrate during the late 1980s, at the height of
the drug war. One leading case is Commonwealth v. Dawson,5 where
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a
substance can be identified as a controlled drug "through the testi-
mony of experienced police officers or the users of the drug rather
than through laboratory analysis or testimony by a qualified chem-
ist.' 14 The court concluded that a chemical test was not absolutely
necessary for most courts hold that circumstantial evidence can, in
some cases, be enough.'5 However, the court went on to state that
"[w] e suspect it would be a rare case in which a witness's statement
that a particular substance looked like a controlled substance would
alone be sufficient to support a conviction." 6 The court's opinion
therefore suggested that testimony that a substance appeared to be a
12. See, e.g., Byers v. State, 594 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that officer's
initial identification of substance as cocaine was later disproved by chemical analysis identifying
substance as heroin); People v. Williams, 185 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ill. 1962) ("[I]t is obvious that
only an experienced expert could identify the white powder taken from the defendant as a
narcotic drug, and there is no suggestion that the officer had the requisite qualifications.")
(citations omitted); People v. Symonds, 310 N.E.2d 208, 215 (I1. App. 1974) ("[Ilt appears that
even an expert cannot positively identify heroin or distinguish it from other white powdery
substances solely by visual inspection."); Copeland v. State, 430 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ind. App.
1982) (reversing conviction where witness "merely identified the substance by sight and did not
inject, inhale, or ingest the substance.... Our examination of the relevant case law has failed
to reveal a conviction which was sustained by merely visual identification alone."); Kelly v. State,
No. 05-94-00887-CR, 1995 WL 110349, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 9, 1995) (noting prohibition on
visual identification testimony).
The prohibition on police officers visually identifying indescript controlled substances
does not extend to officers making such identifications for the purposes of establishing prob-
able cause for arrest. See Gonzalez v. State, 392 S.E.2d 893, 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that trooper's belief that white powdery substance found on seat of car and steering column
was cocaine was sufficient for probable cause to arrest defendant). But see Gonzales v. Texas,
666 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that plain view doctrine was not applicable
to officer searching based on his belief that orange liquid in bottle was methadone). Likewise,
a police officer's testimony that a substance was cocaine has been held to be sufficient at a pre-
liminary hearing. See People v. Wesley, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326, 334-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
13. 504 N.E.2d 1056 (Mass. 1987). At the time Dawson was decided, Massachusetts still had
not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert or lay testimony. See id. at 1057 (holding
that, based on common law, a substance can be identified as a controlled drug through the tes-
timony of experienced police officers); see also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETHW. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICES & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5009 (Supp. 1997) (noting
that Massachussetts has not currently adopted rules of evidence based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence). As noted by ChiefJustice Liacos of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
federal rules are substantially more flexible than the Massachusetts common law rules. See
PAULJ. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 358 (6th ed. 1994).
14. Dawson, 504 N.E.2d at 1057.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1057-58.
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controlled substance is admissible, and could even be sufficient to
prove the identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt if a
court finds that the witness is qualified.17 In an earlier case, the Sec-
ond Circuit allowed a police witness to offer an opinion that a sub-
stance was cocaine,' 8 rejecting the appellants' claim that a chemist's
testimony that cocaine cannot be identified by observation made the
officer's evidence inadmissible.!
During the 1990s, these once-isolated cases have become much
more common. In State v. Nelson,2H the Iowa Court of Appeals re-
jected a defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that the substance at issue was cocaine, specifically upholding the
admissibility of visual identification testimony.2' The defendant ar-
gued that a police officer was not an expert qualified to testify on the
nature of a powdery white substance.22 The court concluded that if
the trial court was satisfied with the witness's qualifications, the wit-
ness may testify as an expert.H The officer's qualifications included
participating in hundreds of drug-related arrests and his testimony
that "he could pick out cocaine from a line-up of various powdery
substances. 2' Relying on an Iowa Supreme Court case where an offi-
cer was permitted to identify marijuana as an expert, the court held
admissible the investigating officer's opinion that a white powder was
cocaine.H
Similarly, in Johnson v. State,26 a forfeiture case, an Alabama appel-
late court upheld the admissibility of narcotics identification based
solely on visual appearance.2 The officer was qualified as an expert
by the trial court based on her "experience in identifying cocaine
and.., her familiarity with the substance."28 The appeals court held
that while the testimony was "minimal, the determination regarding
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert lies within the
17. See id.
18. See United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1975) (determining that special
agent of Drug Enforcement Administration was qualified to make such ajudgment).
19. See id. at 98 n.8.
20. 480 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
21. See id. at 901.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 904.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 903-04 (citing State v. Sykes, 412 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1987)).
26. 667 So. 2d 105 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). Alabama adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1996. SeeWRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5009. The change effected by the adoption of
the federal rules from preexisting Alabama law was to broaden the scope of permissible expert
and lay opinion testimony. SeeALA. R. EVID. 701,702 advisory committee's notes.
27. SeeJohnson, 667 So. 2d at 108 (concluding experienced police officer in field of narcot-
ics is qualified to give his or her opinion as to whether substance seized is cocaine).
28. Id.
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sound discretion of the trial court, and an experienced police officer
in the field of narcotics is qualified to give his or her opinion as one
'who has seen or studied' cocaine." The court then articulated a
low threshold for qualifying a witness as an expert, stating that"[i]f a
witness's knowledge extends beyond or supersedes that of an ordi-
nary witness, as determined by the trial court, the witness may be-
come an expert.""0
Similarly, in the Arkansas case of Rodgers v. State,"' a police officer
inspecting an 18-wheeler at a weigh station conducted a consensual
search of the defendant's truck and found a pinkish-white powder
that he suspected was methamphetamine.32 The defendant fled from
the scene with the substance and disposed of it in nearby weeds; the
officer was unable to find it.33 The Arkansas Court of Appeals found
that the officer's "training and experience" in identifying drugs and
making arrests for possession established his qualifications to render
an opinion that the substance was methamphetamine.34
Other courts have made similar rulings. In United States v. Harrel4s
for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[i]dentification
based on past use coupled with present observation of the substance
at hand will suffice to establish the illicit nature of a suspected sub-
stance." 6 Although the evidence in Harrell itself was more defini-
tive, 7 that language suggests broad permissibility of visual identifica-
tion testimony. Similarly in State v. Evans,s the Louisiana Court of
Appeals suggested that an appropriately qualified expert police offi-
cer could make a visual identification of a suspected controlled sub-
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Wills v. State, 867 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (positing that it is
not objectionable for an officer to testify that a substance found in a matchbook was cocaine
where the officer explained that he had lengthy experience with illegal narcotics, and was able
to identify cocaine).
31. No. CA CR 95-266, 1996 WL 89180 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1996). Arkansas adopted
the federal rules on expert and lay opinion testimony via the Supreme Court of Arkansas as
part of its ruling in Ricarte v. State, 717 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Ark. 1986).
32. See Rodgers, 1996 WL 89180 at *1-2.
33. Seeid. at *1.
34. See id. at *2. The court added that the defendant's flight corroborated evidence of
guilt. See id. Yet consciousness of guilt evidence does not help identify a particular substance.
Thus, it seems clear that the visual identification was an indispensable predicate to the convic-
tion and appellate affirmance. See id. (articulating that lay testimony and circumstantial evi-
dence can be sufficient to establish the identity of a questionable substance).
35. 737 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 978-79.
37. In Harred4 the prosecution's witness testified that he was a user and pusher of an as-
sortment of drugs. See id. at 979. Such experience, coupled with observations of appellant's
characteristic behavior (selling speed), qualified the witness to identify the substance that he
observed appellant snorting. See id.
38. 593 So. 2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1992). Louisiana has adopted Federal Rule of Evidence
702 essentially unchanged. See id. at 902.
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stance. 9 Presumably, these appellate decisions have been followed by
subordinate courts in their respective jurisdictions.
II. FACTUAL PROBLEMS WITH VISUAL IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
The growing tolerance for admitting opinion testimony based
solely on visual inspection is troubling, initially, because it simply
cannot be done; no one can reliably identify an unknown substance
simply by looking at it. The trend is also problematic because of the
increasing problem of imitation drugs, which are designed to appear
to be controlled substances but are actually fraudulent substitutes.
Given these circumstances, visual opinion testimony is likely to be
highly unreliable.
A. Visual Analysis of Powders: It Cannot Be Done
There are literally millions of chemical substances that can be
made into a white powder; only a comparative handful of these are
controlled substances.Y Perhaps Superman with his x-ray vision
could tell them apart, but there seems to be a scientific consensus
that narcotics do not display external physical characteristics dis-
cernible to mere mortals that can be reliably used to distinguish
them.4'
Dr. James Tong, a Professor and Director of the Forensic Chemis-
try Program at Ohio State University who earned his Ph.D. from the
University of California at Berkeley, has worked for both the prosecu-
tion and defense in various criminal cases. As he explains:
there are countless white powders. Even under microscopic ex-
amination, you can't tell which is which. Why do we buy instru-
ments that may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars (such as a
GCMS, a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer) to identify sub-
stances, if we can tell what they are just by looking at them? Why
have analytical chemistry at all if we can tell what something is
based on appearance?
42
39. See id. The police officer's testimony was limited, however, "only to what his experi-
ence as a police officer would give him." Id. Because the record did not reveal the amount of
time that the officer had been with the police force, he did not qualify as an expert. See id. The
court concluded, however, that the error in admitting the testimony was harmless because the
defense had stipulated to a laboratory report indicating that the substance was cocaine. See id.
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994) (establishing and listing five schedules of controlled sub-
stances).
41. See Marc G. Kur-zman & Dwight Fullerton, Drug Identification, in SCIENTIFIC & EXPERT
EVIDENCE 523-54 (EdwardJ. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed. 1981) (stating that no reputable scientist
would accept a chemical "identification" absent "scientific proof" of a substance's identity be-
cause "presumed identification" by police officers, health professionals, or street users is often
incorrect).
42. Telephone interview with Dr.JamesY. Tong, Professor and Director, Forensic Chemis-
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Dr. Henry Lee, Director of the Connecticut State Police Forensic
Laboratory, likewise rejects the idea that visual inspection is a reliable
means of identifying controlled substances.
The problem is that the color and granularity of controlled sub-
stances can be altered at will by the manufacturer; thus, pure heroin
can be fine-grained or coarse, nearly yellow or snow-white.4 The
same is true of cocaine, methamphetamine, or nearly any of the con-
trolled substances that can be sold in the form of a white powder.45
Even if narcotics did have unique physical attributes, most narcotics
sold on the street are "cut"-diluted with cheap and legal substances
so a small amount of pure narcotic can be sold to many users. 6 Thus,
much of what an officer sees is not cocaine or heroin, but inositol,
powdered sugar, or another adulterant.
47
Indeed, the probability that a substance sold in the illicit drug
market contains some adulterant or has been modified chemically
renders the job of even experienced forensic toxicologists to be diffi-
cult. Texts from the discipline of forensic toxicology bear this out.
4 8
Even well recognized tablets and capsules are suspect: visual recogni-
tion "can only be regarded as a useful clue; even tablets with well-
known brand names may be faked."49 Thus, forensic chemists have
developed a range of sophisticated analytical methods for determin-
ing the chemical composition of a substance, including color tests,
immunoassays, thin-layer chromatography, gas chromatography, high
pressure liquid chromatography, ultraviolet, visible, and fluorescence
pectrophotometry, mass spectrometry, infra-red spectrophotometry,
nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, and countless subtech-
niques of these tests.5
If a substance could be identified simply by looking at it, the rituals
try Program, Ohio State University (June 8, 1997).
43. Telephone interview with Dr. Henry Lee, Director of Connecticut State Police Foren-
sic Laboratory (June 11, 1997).
44. See, e.g., People v. Espino, 616 N.Y.S.2d 782 (App. Div. 1994) (testimony introduced
that under certain conditions cocaine can change color); Brown v. State, No. 07-96-0178-CR,
1997 WL 40787 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that rocks of cocaine often become powder).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TOFORENSIC SCIENCE 267-
68 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that illicit dealers add sugar, starch, and quinine to dilute potency of
controlled substances and stretch their market value).
47. See id.
48. See id. (stating that outward appearance of drug specimens and complexity of drug
preparations are evidence of difficult analytical chore facing forensic chemist).
49. J.V. Jackson, Forensic Toxicolog, in CLARKE'S ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF DRUGS
51(1986).
50. See generally id. (reviewing chemical, analytical and physical identification procedures
for drugs); Bruce Stein et al., An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories
and the Qualifications of Their Analysis, in SCIENTIFIC & EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 453-
98.
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of qualifying forensic chemists would have to be regarded as strange
indeed. Such witnesses are typically qualified as experts based on
formal education (usually a minimum of a four-year college degree),
in addition to special training and years of experience in performing
chemical analyses on controlled substances. 5' Forensic specialists are
qualified to identify powdery controlled substances because chemical
analyses reveal distinctive characteristics of the substance consistent
with a particular illicit controlled substance.52 There are numerous
specific and non-specific5 laboratory tests used to identify sub-
stances.5 The forensic specialist is thus properly qualified as an ex-
pert based on his or her ability to discern the chemical composition
of illicit controlled substances through chemical analysis.
The training and expertise of forensic chemists is important be-
cause identifying controlled substances is difficult. In part, the diffi-
culty arises because the forensic analyst is "faced with the prospect
that his or her unknown [substance] may be any one of a thousand
or more commonly encountered drugs." 6 In addition, various drugs
are produced in a wide variety of forms and may contain any number
of dilutants. 57  Thus, "[w]hen a forensic chemist picks up a drug
specimen for analysis, anything can be expected to be found, and all
contingencies must be prepared for."
Moreover, police procedural custom"' illustrates that officers do
not conclusively rely on visual identifications of controlled sub-
stances. Criminal investigation texts bear this out.
Many such drugs are common and are easily recognized by en-
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Echevarria, 575 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)(admitting testimony of criminologist who had a college degree in biology with a minor in
chemistry, who received further training in the identification of illegal substances at both
Pennsylvania State Police laboratory and at a seminar conducted by the Federal Drug En-
forcement agency, and who had testified as an expert in numerous courts on many occasions).
52. See DAVID BERNHEIM, 2 DEFENSE OF NARcoTIcs CASES § 4.01 (1996) (observing that in
most narcotic prosecutions, identification of drug seized depends on analytical procedures of
government laboratory); SAFERSTEIN, supra note 46, at 267-75 (detailing chemical and instru-
mental tests scientists employ to pinpoint identity of drug specimen).
53. A test result is specific for a particular drug if the result occurs only when that drug is
present. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23-2
(1986).
54. Non-specific tests may lead to filse-positive results, where a result indicates that a par-
ticular drug is present when in fact another drug is present. See id.
55. For a summary of tests identifying suspected illicit drugs, see id. § 23-2-3(D).
56. SAFERSTEIN, supra note 46, at 268.
57. See id. at 249 (noting that currently, average purity of a heroin bag obtained in the il-
licit U.S. market is 35%; the other 65% consists of additives such as sugar, starch, and quinine).
58. Id. at 268.
59. "Where the police and most police-related litigation are concerned, custom and prac-
tice is the best professional thinking about the manner in which field problems should be re-
solved." JamesJ. Fyfe, Police Expert Witnesses, in EXPERT WITNESSES 107 (Patrick R. Anderson &
L. Thomas Winfree,Jr., eds., 1987).
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forcement agents, but if complete coverage is to be achieved, the po-
lice officer must have at his disposal an efficient laboratory staffed
with knowledgeable personnel. The task of the police officer is
to... make preliminary identification of the drug. The identifica-
tion should always be subjected to laboratory testing, however, to
ensure the degree of certainty necessary for court purposes and to
exclude all legally permissible drugs. °
Another text instructs that "[t]he trained forensic chemist or
criminalist should be an integral part of any such investigation" be-
cause "[tiraining and experience in dealing with chemicals is ex-
tremely important... from the standpoint of identifying drugs as fin-
ished products or intermediate products.' Thus, the criminal
investigation texts clearly indicate that, for internal procedures, law
enforcement agencies rely on laboratory analyses rather than visual
identification of substances.
Experience bears out the untrustworthy nature of such evidence.
Indeed, observers have noted a potential error rate in visual identifi-
cation to be as high as sixty percent.62 For instance, in Illinois v. La-
fayette,6 the Supreme Court held that pills containing
"amphetamines" were properly seized pursuant to a police station-
house inventory search.6 It turned out, however, that in March,
1981, two years before the Supreme Court decided the appeal, the
government testing lab concluded that there was, in fact, no con-
trolled substance in the pills.65 In 1996, police in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, arrested two men on cocaine trafficking charges.6 Despite the
protestations of the two men, the police believed the "fist-sized white
chunks packaged in plastic" found in the car to be cocaine, and held
the men in jail for two days while awaiting a laboratory report.67 The
officers' belief was bolstered by the fact that their canine assistant,
trained to sniff out cocaine, "hit" on the alleged cocaine several
times.? The laboratory report confirmed that the white chunks were
not cocaine, but dried yogurt!6 An Idaho case saw another
60. PAUL L. KIRK, CRIME INVESTIGATION 357-58 (JohnJ. Thornton ed., 2d ed. 1974);see also
WAYNE W. BENNETT & KAREN M. HEss, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 470 (1987) ("Field tests can be
conducted to serve as the basis for a search warrant, but such tests must always be verified by
laboratory examination.").
61. BARRYA.J. FISHER, TECHNIQUES OF CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION 340 (1992).
62. See Kurzman & Fullerton, supra note 41, at 524.
63. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
64. Id. at 648.
65. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis at 3, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)
(No. 81-1859).
66. See Wite Powder Yogurt?, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Nov. 4, 1996, at A6.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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food/controlled substance mix-up, when a prosecution witness iden-
tified hot apple cider as liquified methamphetamine Prosecutors
and defense lawyers often have numerous such stories; Cliff Fishman,
for example, a former member of the New York City Special Narcot-
ics Prosecutor's Office, reported that one investigation he knew of
resulted in the payment of $20,000 for a large quantity of white pow-
dery substance that turned out to be Aunt Jemima's Pancake Mix.71
Similarly, Professor John Flym of Northeastern recounted a case in
which he represented a Tufts undergraduate accused of possessing
seventy-five pounds of cocaine. After the court ordered the sub-
stance tested, it turned out to contain no trace of cocaine or other
narcotic substances.'
B. The Problem of Imitation Drugs
The rise of criminal prohibitions on sale of imitation narcotics is
also evidence of the tremendous practical problem that would arise
from wider adoption of the visual identification rule. Trafficking in
"look-alike" imitation controlled substances is so pervasive that legis-
latures have enacted criminal statutes proscribing their sale.5 By
1991, all but two states had adopted provisions addressing "imitation
controlled substances." 74 An imitation controlled substance is an un-
controlled substance fraudulently sold as an illicit controlled sub-
stance!5 Generally, penalties are less severe for violations involving
these "look-alike" imitation controlled substances.76 Legislatures have
acted against the sale of such substances because of the danger posed
where one who ingests a false, innocuous substance may later suffer
harm from ingesting a larger dose of the real thing, and because of
70. SeeState v. Mitchell, 937 P.2d 960, 963 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). In fact, the prosecution
witness mistakenly thought that hot apple cider was the actual controlled substance delivered
by respondent. See id.
71. See Letter (electronic mail) from Cliff Fishman to Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor
of Law, Western New England College School of Law (May 23, 1997) (on file with The American
University Law Review).
72. See Letter (electronic mail) from John Flym, Professor of Law, Northeastern University
School of Law, to Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College
School of Law (May 21, 1997) (on file with The American University Law Review).
73. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 675 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1996) (sale of look-alike substances
occurs with such regularity that legislature has proscribed sale); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 817.564 (West Supp. 1996) (making it third degree felony to manufacture, sell, distribute, or
possess with intent to manufacture, sell, or distribute any imitation controlled substance);N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3383 (McKinney 1991) (creating felony crime of possession, manufacture,
sale, or distribution of imitation controlled substances).
74. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A GUIDE TO STATE CONTROLLED SuBsTANCESAcTs 21 (1991).
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also People v. Watkins, 526 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that
penalty for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver was three to seven years incarceration,
while the penalty for look-alike substances was two to five years).
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the potential dangers of ingesting the variety of substances passed off
as controlled substances.7
The prevalence of imitation controlled substances, and the con-
comitant potential for error in identifying genuine controlled sub-
stances, creates the risk of inaccuracies in the determination of guilt
or innocence.78 Particularly in light of the fact that penalties for of-
fenses involving genuine and imitation controlled substances may
differ widely, courts should take care to prevent misidentification."
Many of the statutes criminalizing possession or sale of imitation
controlled substances require that they appear to be real drugs.' As
a result, the reporters are filled with cases describing testimony by
police and other skilled witnesses that they thought a substance was
controlled when in fact it was not. In Anderson v. State,81 for example,
the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for selling a simu-
lated controlled substance because the item looked like a rock of
crack cocaine to an experienced narcotics officer, even though it was
not.82  In State v. Carey,83 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
similarly held that an imitation substance that turned out to be
cornmeal sufficiently appeared to be cocaine to the law enforcement
officer."4
These statutes and cases make two things very clear. First, there
will be cases in which substances appear to be heroin, cocaine, meth-
77. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1987) (addressing possibility that
strong controlled substances can be confused with a weaker "look-alike," as well as the danger
of interfering with a physician treating an overdose because of confusion between fake and real
controlled substances). An array of dangerous powders can be readily passed off as controlled
substances. See id. In Commonwealth v. Perez, 664 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), the defendant
exclusively sold imitation substances, as no dealer would trust him with genuine narcotics for
fear that he would consume rather than sell the drugs. In Perez the actual identity of the sub-
stance involved was laundry detergent. See id. at 583-84.
78. See Murdock v. State, 426 S.E.2d 740 (S.C. 1992) (concluding that defendant's consti-
tutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated due to counsel's failure to correctly
identify substance as an imitation substance).
79. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.242 (1994) (delivery of imitation of controlled substance
is Class D felony, with a maximum sentence not to exceed five years), with id. § 195.211
(delivery of controlled substance is Class B felony, with a sentence of five to fifteen years).
80. Compare AmZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3456 (1994) (stating possession of imitation controlled
substances with intent to use is a class 2 felony), with id. § 13-3407 (stating possession of dan-
gerous drug is class 4 felony).
81. 895 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
82. See id. at 758.
83. 914 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
84. See id. at 95-96. The law enforcement officer testified that the substance "appeared
similar to other substances that he had seen which tested positive for cocaine." Id. at 95. A
chemist had testified that the white powder "could be consistent with cocaine or metham-
phetamine or any number of other controlled substances. Just by looking at it I could not tell
whether it was or was not a controlled substance." Id.; see also Billups v. State, 424 S.E.2d 355,
357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming conviction for selling an imitation controlled substance,
noting that "the appearance of the non-controlled substance was... 'substantially identical' to
that of rock cocaine").
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amphetamine or other controlled substances, but are not. Second,
the fact that there is a market for imitation drugs suggests that simple
observation is not an effective way to identify powders, even by peo-
ple with strong incentives to guess correctly.' Drug buyers are likely
to know what drugs look like; indeed, user testimony about the ef-
fects of narcotic substances are one of the most common methods of
expert identification. 6  If addicts can be fooled, anyone can be
fooled.
C. Rules of Random Sampling: Is This Powder That Powder?
Another line of cases also suggests that conclusions drawn from
visual identification of suspected narcotic substances are not likely to
be reliable. Courts have recognized that when more than one con-
tainer of suspected narcotics is seized by police, they do not necessar-
ily contain the same substance.87 Courts generally refuse to hold that
the test of one sample automatically applies to another sample. The
weight of authority supports, as a general rule, that no inference of
identity of a powdered substance may be made based on a chemical
analysis of a substance in a separate container that was also recovered
from the defendant.9 The reasoning behind the rule is that:
85. Note that the defendant in Perz exclusively sold imitation substances. See Common-
wealth v. Perez, 664 A.2d 582 (Pa. 1995).
86. See Commonwealth v. Dawson, 504 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (Mass. 1984) (holding that users
of controlled substances are qualified to identify such substances through testimony).
87. See Ross v. State, 528 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988) (concluding that testing
only two of ninety bags of alleged cocaine but weighing all did not establish prima facie case for
cocaine trafficking); People v. Jones, 675 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1996) ("Whether the untested
packets in the instant case may have contained cocaine or mere look-alike substances is pure
conjecture."); People v. Ayala, 422 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that testing
only one of two bags of alleged heroin is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
both bags contained heroin).
88. See Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1241; Ayala, 422 N.E.2d at 129.
89. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 563 So. 2d 202, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the requisite amount to show delivery offense was not established "where chemist only tested
one or two heroin capsules found in a change purse"); Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1241 (concluding
that where two of ninety-two plastic packets, all found in single paper bag, tested conclusively
for powder cocaine, evidence was held insufficient to establish requisite amount, even though
contents of all ninety-two packets looked alike); People v. Young, 581 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Il. App.
Ct. 1991) (concluding that even though three baggies and numerous paper packets were all
found in one paper bag, the evidence was insufficient to show the requisite amount where only
one baggie and one packet were tested and shown to be powdered cocaine); People v. Maiden,
569 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining that evidence was insufficient to prove
requisite amount for sentence where all three bottles of suspected PCP field tested positive, but
only one subjected to test was identified as PCP); People v. Hill, 524 N.E.2d 604, 611 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) ("Where separate bags or containers of suspected drugs are seized, a sample from
each bag or container must be conclusively tested to prove that it contains a controlled sub-
stance."); Ayala, 422 N.E.2d at 129 (holding that conclusive test of sample of substance taken
from only one of two bags, both of which had field tested positive for heroin, presents infer-
ence sufficient for preponderance but insufficient for reasonable doubt standard that both
bags contained heroin); People v. Games, 418 N.E.2d 520, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (positing
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[A] sample taken from only one of multiple receptacles will not
support the inference that all of the receptacles contain that same
substance, even if the substance in all the receptacles appear to be
the same, if other substances resemble the sampled substance. Be-
cause any of a number of substances look like powdered cocaine or
heroin, the inference that the whole, or a requisite amount, is the
same as a sample taken from fewer than all of the receptacles, or at
least enough receptacles to show the requisite amount, is not com-
pelling enough to justify a jury finding to a level of confidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt.90
An inference may be drawn from a sample, however, where the
substance is in a homogeneous, outwardly recognizable form such as
pills.9' Courts have reached similar conclusions in regard to rock
"crack" cocaine.92 These decisions also rest on the idea that rocks of
cocaine may be sufficiently homogenous and distinct in appearance
to permit such identification.93 Some courts disagree, however, pri-
that chemist's testimony that one of two bags proved to be cannabis, and that both bags to-
gether weighed requisite amount, was not sufficient to establish requisite amount was canna-
bis); Gabriel v. State, 900 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. Grim. App. 1995) (en banc) (Clinton, J. con-
curring) (citing People v.Yosell, 368 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)).
Where suspected contraband is found in separate receptacles, however, courts have
generally required that at least a sample from each receptacle be tested before ajury
can say with a level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the substance,
or at least enough of it to establish the jurisdictional amount, contains that alleged
contraband.
Id. But see State v. Riley, 587 So. 2d 130, 133 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that testing of only
six of thirty-three baggies of white powder substance, all found in a single trash can, was
enough to show all thirty-three were cocaine).
90. Gabrie4 900 S.W.2d at 726 (Clinton, J., concurring) (distinguishing instance of rock
cocaine sampling from that of heroin or cocaine).
91. "It has been held that random sampling of an apparentiy homogeneous substance
wholly contained within a single receptacle is sufficient to prove that the whole is contraband."
Id. at 725 (citing People v. Kaudis, 497 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ill. App. 1986) (holding that a conclu-
sive test of a random sample of pills found in a single bag was sufficient to prove requisite
amount of methaqualone, where pills were all same size, shape, color and density, and each was
marked "Lemmon 714"); People v.Yosell, 368 N.E.2d 735, 738 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) (finding that
test was sufficient where one tablet from each of ten baggies found in a single bag tested con-
clusive for barbituric acid); People v. Ohley, 303 N.E.2d 761, 766-67 (11. App. Ct. 1973)
(holding that field test of twelve tablets, and then conclusive test of six more to be LSD was suf-
ficient to conclude that all eighty-nine delivered were LSD)).
92. See State v. Meeks, 552 So. 2d 328, 328 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that state
was not required to test all cocaine rocks to sufficiently prove that all seized were crack co-
caine); Bond v. State, 538 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that because ap-
pearance of "rock" cocaine is homogeneous like many pills, testing one of 139 small baggies
was sufficient to show that all were "rock" crack cocaine); State v. Bellom, 562 So. 2d 1073, 1075
(La. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that testing of only four of 1095 baggies of rock cocaine seized
was sufficient to prove that all baggies contained rock cocaine).
93. In State v. Gibson, 856 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), the court recounted a crimi-
nalist's testimony regarding the process of making crack cocaine noting that"[c]ocaine base is
made by mixing cocaine powder with baking soda and water and cooking it. The resulting
crystalline will fall to the bottom and is cut up into smaller chunks. This evidence is probative
that the rocks were all cut from one 'batch' of rock cocaine, rather than from separate
sources." Id.
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marily because of the prevalence of imitation controlled substances.94
In People v. Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a sentence re-
duction because only two of the five packets of alleged rock cocaine
for which the defendant was convicted and sentenced were tested.95
The court reasoned:
What inference can be drawn concerning the composition of the
three packets not tested? Without more, the answer is none at all.
And in this case, the five packets containing loose substances can-
not be equated with identically marked and stamped tablets, pills,
or capsules. While it is not difficult to speculate, as did the trial
judge, that the remaining three packets may have contained co-
caine, such a finding must be based upon evidence and not upon
guess, speculation, or conjecture.%
The court's primary concern was the possibility that the untested
substances may have been imitation controlled substances. The
court asserted that the state was in the best position to determine the
identity of the substance as it could have easily tested a sample from
each.Y6
This case implicitly recognizes that visual identifications of pow-
dered substances are unreliable. If trained forensic chemists may not
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of a substance by in-
ference from a sample of a substance identical in appearance that
was also recovered from the suspect, it is hardly plausible that a po-
lice officer, untrained in forensic chemistry, having conducted no
tests whatsoever, may determine the chemical composition of a sub-
stance by merely looking at it. The potential for error is beyond any
conception of reliability, let alone the requisite evidentiary reliability
required to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. IDENTIFYING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
While most jurisdictions have liberalized the standards for admis-
sion of opinion testimony, minimum standards of reliability, helpful-
ness and rationality are required by the modern approach typified by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The following section demonstrates
94. SeePeople v.Jones, 675 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1996) (holding that because look-alike sub-
stances are sold with such regularity, all packets of alleged cocaine must be tested).
95. See id.; see also State v. Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1994) (reversing conviction
for sale of ten grams of crack cocaine where total weight of sampled packages was less than ten
grams because packaging was not homogenous and there was possibility that unsampled pack-
ages contained placebo).
96. Jones, 675 N.E.2d at 101.
97. See id. (noting that "[w]hether the untested packets in the instant case may have con-
tained cocaine or mere look-alike substances is pure conjecture").
98. See id.
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that the visual identification rule has exceeded even the liberal
bounds of the federal rules, and risks violating constitutional protec-
tions of due process of law.
A prosecution for possession or sale of a controlled substance re-
quires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
suspected drug is, indeed, a drug." Proving the specific identity of
the substance is also indispensable; the penalty for possession or sale
of controlled substances can vary widely depending on which of the
scores of substances regulated by state and federal criminal codes a
defendant possesses or sells.' °° Moreover, a substance suspected of
being controlled may in fact be something else, such as an inno-
cently-possessed non-controlled substance. Alternatively, a substance
consistent with narcotics could in fact be a "look-alike" substance, an
imitation drug, the possession of which may be unlawful, but subject
to a lesser penalty than can be imposed for possession of real drugs.''
This section describes the rules regarding admission of the opinion
testimony which is necessary to prove the identification of a con-
trolled substance in general. It also describes the particular methods
which have been used to prove that a substance is controlled, includ-
ing chemical testing, testimony by an experienced drug user, and cir-
cumstantial evidence.
A. Expert and Lay Opinion Testimony
Identification of a questioned substance as a controlled substance
requires opinion testimony. Powders and pills are, after all, mute;
identification of a substance as a drug requires drawing inferences
and conclusions beyond observing or recounting more-or-less
"objective" physical phenomena. 2
Most states follow the approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence
99. See State v. Cole, 906 P.2d 925, 938-39 n.18 (Wash. 1995) (possession with intent to de-
liver requires proof of nature of substance). Of course, defendants may be prosecuted for the
sale of counterfeit drugs as well. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1 (1995)
[hereinafter SENTENCING MANUAL]. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(noting that due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment prohibits conviction without proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
100. See SENTENCING MANUAL § 2Dl.1 (distinguishing base offense levels by identity of the
substance). For instance, for sentencing purposes, one kilogram of heroin is the equivalent of
five kilograms of cocaine. See id. at 83.
101. See Jones, 675 N.E.2d at 101 ("Look-alike substances (pseudo narcotics) are sold with
such regularity that the legislature has drafted a criminal statute proscribing their sale."); see
also Richard L. Braun, Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1990, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 365, 369
(1991) (listing penalties for imitation controlled substances, not included in 1970 Uniform
Controlled Substances Act which were added in the 1990 Act).
102. SeeJAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARYTREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 524
(1898) ("In a sense all testimony to matter of fact is opinion evidence, i.e. it is a conclusion
formed from phenomena and mental impressions.").
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when dealing with opinion testimony."' Rule 701,'0, regulating lay
opinion testimony, and Rule 702,'05 regulating expert opinion testi-
mony, both emerged from the common-law "opinion rule,"' 6  but
they substantially liberalized it. The general rule at common law in
the United States regarding testimony by lay witnesses was that a wit-
ness may not offer a "mere opinion.' ' 7 A "mere opinion," it was ar-
gued, constituted testimony that was "a guess, a belief without good
grounds."" However, the distinction between fact and opinion itself
proved to be elusive, if not impossible to draw,"* and disruptive to
trial proceedings."0 Federal Rule of Evidence 701 ' obviated the
common law requirement for rigid compartmentalization of lay wit-
ness testimony into fact or opinion." Instead, Rule 701 permits wit-
103. As of 1993, thirty-five states had adopted or adapted the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 267 n.5 (1993). The states applying the federal
rules are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. Since then Alabama, Maryland, and NewJersey have substantially adopted the
federal rules, raising the current total number to thirty-eight. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 13, § 5009 (listing states that have adopted Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to opin-
ion testimony).
104. FED. R. EVID. 701.
105. FED. R. EVID. 702.
106. See 7JoHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1917-1929 (James
H. Chadbourn rev., 1978) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
107. See id. § 1917; see also Hon. Charles R. Richey, Proposals To Eliminate the Preudicial Effect
of the Use of the Word "Expert" Under the Federal Rules [oft Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials,
154 F.R.D. 537, 542 (1994) ("Mere opinions were considered unreliable bases for testimony.").
108. 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 106, § 1917. Courts excluded such opinion tes-
timony on the grounds of lack of testimonial qualifications. See id.
109. See Honorable Alvin B. Rubin, Federal Rules of Evidence Opinion and Expert Testimony
(Rules 701-706), in TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS C607 ALI-ABA 69, 71 (1991) ("Courts and lawyers continue to
have difficulty distinguishing between what is 'fact' and what is 'opinion.' ... There is no con-
ceivable statement, however specific, detailed, and 'factual,' that is not in some measure the
product of inference and reflection as well as observation and memory.").
110. Judge Learned Hand summarized the problem:
Every judge of experience in the trial of causes has again and again seen the whole
story garbled, because of insistence upon a form with which the witness cannot com-
ply, since, like most men, he is unaware of the extent to which inference enters into
his perceptions. He is telling the "facts" in the only way that he knows how, and the
result of nagging and checking him is often to choke him altogether, which is, indeed,
usually its purpose.
Central R.R. Co. v. Monohan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926),quoted in Asplundh Mfg. Div. v.
Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1995).
111. FED. R. EVID. 701. The Rule states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opin-
ions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perceptions of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
112. The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized "the practical
impossibility of determining by rule what is a 'fact.'" FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's
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nesses to state their opinions or draw inferences when rationally
based on the witness' perception and the opinion would be helpful
to the trier of fact."3
The opinion or inference must be one that a rational person
would draw based on the observed facts.114 This requirement reflects
the common law objection to opinion testimony based on the super-
fluousness of the testimony.115 While the scope of admissibility of lay
opinion testimony under Rule 701 is, under current practice, expan-
sive, it is not unlimited; thus, the rationality and reliability of lay
opinion regarding technical matters that border on expert opinion
should be "rigorously examined" as a preliminary matter by the trial
judge."5 Examples of permissible lay opinions include the age,
height or weight of a person observed by a witness, whether a person
observed by a witness was intoxicated, and the speed of an automo-
bile observed by the witness.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702117 expanded the common law "skilled
witness" exception to the opinion rule by declaring expert testimony
admissible when it will assist the trier of fact."8 Rule 702 also broad-
ened the common law approach by making clear that an expert may
testify even about matters that commonly are understood by lay ju-
rors.1 9 Further, in contrast to the traditional approach, under Fed-
note; see also Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1195 ("Rule 701 represents a moment away from the courts'
historically skeptical view of lay opinion evidence.").
113. FED. R. EVID. 701. The difference in admissibility of lay opinion testimony under the
common law and federal rules approach is illustrated by United States v. Yazzie 976 F.2d 1252
(9th Cir. 1992). In Yazzie, the defendant was charged with statutory rape. The defendant as-
serted reasonable mistake as a defense, and called several witnesses to testify that they per-
ceived the minor on the date of the incident to be older than sixteen. See id. at 1254. The trial
court excluded the testimony as lay "opinion." See id. at 1253. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed, holding that such testimony was admissible under Rule 701. See id. at 1255.
114. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'SFEDERAL EVIDENCE § 701.3, at 339 (1995)
(observing that lay opinion requires first hand knowledge of subject of testimony and that opin-
ion advanced must be one that a rational person would make from observed facts).
115. See id. § 701.4, at 340-41.
116. Id.
117. FED. R. EVID. 702. The Rule states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note ("Whether the situation is a proper
one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier.").
The Federal Rules of Evidence adopt the Wigmore position that testimony should be excluded
if superfluous. "When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore
superfluous and a waste of time." Id. (citing 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 106, § 1918).
119. See Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insur-
ing Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 49 ("Even as to matters within
the common knowledge and experience ofjurors, courts permit expert testimony if the testi-
mony helps the jury."). The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ex-
plains the expanded scope of subject matter:
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the
1998] IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 577
eral Rule of Evidence 704 an expert may testify to the ultimate issue
in a case.'2 Finally, the Federal Rules abandoned the common law
requirement that experts disclose the basis for their opinion before
rendering it.'
2
'
Under the Federal Rules approach, the trial judge must determine
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert.'22 This determi-
nation is in part an inquiry into the reliability of the evidence.23 The
question is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the par-
ticular subject matter and witness.' 24 The qualifications of the pur-
ported expert must fairly match the subject matter of the proposed
"scientific" and "technical" but extend to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the
expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education." Thus within the scope of the rule are not only
experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists and architects, but
also the large group sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or landown-
ers testifying to land values.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
120. See FED. R. EVID. 704. Rule 704 states:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or in-
ference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate is-
sue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a de-
fendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defen-
dant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier
of fact alone.
While expert testimony on the ultimate issue in a case is admissible under the federal
rules, there is significant authority holding that such testimony by law enforcement officers in
criminal cases should be given little or no weight by a court that is evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction. See United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 234-35
(2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that agent's "expert" conclusions are entitled to little weight in
court's sufficiency analysis); United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that caution should be exercised in admitting expert testimony of government agents partici-
pating in a drug buy); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman,J.,
concurring) (questioning "whether an expert's opinion that events he observed constitute drug
transaction provides very much, if any, assistance to jury, beyond whatever inference is available
to be drawn by the jury from all evidence"). For an argument that such limitations on expert
ultimate issue testimony should be extended, see Deon J. Nossel, The Admissibility of Ultimate
Issue Expert Testimony By Law Enforcement Officers In Criminal Trials, 93 COLuM. L. REV. 231
(1993).
121. SeeFED. R. EVID. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on
cross-examination.").
122. SeeFED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that questions of admissibility concerning qualification
of a person to be a witness shall be determined by the court); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (stating that pursuant to Rule 104(a), trial judge must
determine at the outset the grounds on which the expert is proposing to testify); United States
v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The trialjudge has broad discretion in the matter
of the admission or exclusion of expert testimony and evidence .... ").
123. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 114, § 702.3, at 345-46 ("[T]he expert testimony must
be based upon reliable theories or principles.").
124. See7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 106, § 1923 ("On this subject can ajury receive
from this person appreciable help? In other words, the test is a relative one, depending on the
particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that subject.").
THE AMERICAN UNVERsrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:557
testimonyls
In addition, the judge must determine whether the evidence will
be helpful to the trier of fact in the particular case.126 This is largely a
question of relevance. 7 Although the number of situations in which
jurors could benefit from expert opinion evidence is large,'28 there
are limits. Expert testimony is inadmissible where the topic is too
plain or obvious for jurors to benefit from it, or where the testimony
might impair the jury's independent judgment29 Likewise, expert
opinion testimony is inadmissible where it is speculative,'" based on
false premises, or grounded on a mere hunch.13 Thus, though the
Federal Rules approach expanded the permissible range of opinion
testimony, there remains a concern for reliability.
The requirement that proposed expert testimony be reliable is un-
derscored by the line of cases dealing with scientific evidence. The
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.,'" held
that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, admissibility turns on
whether the testimony is reliable and relevant. '3 To show that the
125. See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 349, at
609 (2d ed. 1994) ("Regardless how impressive the background of a witness, his area of exper-
tise should match fairly closely the subject matter of his testimony.").
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
127. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (finding that the helpfulness issue goes primarily to rele-
vance); see alsoWEISSENBERGER, supra note 114, § 702.3, at 345-46 ("Clearly, expert testimony
must be relevant to the subject matter of the trial in order to assist the trier of fact.").
128. See 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 125, § 350, at 625 ("Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a serious question arising in a suit that some kind of expert could not illuminate in
ways that might be useful to lay factfinders.").
129. See id. at 625-26 (observing that many appellate courts exclude expert testimony where
the subject is too commonplace to benefit from expert insights); see also United States v. Carr,
965 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (excluding linguist's testimony interpreting taped conversa-
tions that were in English); Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R1R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.
1989) (concluding that forensic engineer's testimony that plaintiff, who walked 3,000 feet
along tracks after falling, could not tell what track oncoming train was on should have been
excluded).
130. See 3MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 125, § 350, at 628 (explaining that expert
testimony is unhelpful where expert is speculating); see also United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675,
682-83 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that there was no error in excluding testimony of warden con-
cerning likelihood that inmate could have sex with wife or take drugs without other inmates
knowing); Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) (excluding ex-
pert testimony offered to prove that future wages would have led to increased inflation).
131. See 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 125, § 350, at 628-29; see also Shatkin v.
McDonnel Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no error in excluding
testimony regarding Mrs. Shatkin's financial condition, standard of living and her son's possi-
ble future income for lack of foundation); United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 885 (1st
Cir. 1984) (affirming that there was no error in exclusion of appraiser's testimony where ap-
praisal lacked foundation).
132. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
133. See id. at 589. The Court explained that Rule 702 requires that expert scientific evi-
dence meet the standards of "evidentiary reliability"-trustworthiness. See id. at 590-91 n.9.
The Court also observed that the Rule 702 requirement that proffered evidence "assist the trier
of fact" was essentially a test of relevance. See id. at 591.
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opinion is reliable, the proponent must rule out the intrusion of
"subjective belief or unsupported speculation."'34 The Court articu-
lated specific "gatekeeping" factors to be considered by the trial court
when determining the reliability of scientific expert testimony. '
While the Daubert standard has not been uniformly adopted by the
state courts,M the earlier Fye standard employed by most jurisdic-
tions requiring "general acceptance" of the methods employed by the
expert has been incorporated into the Daubert framework. 8 Thus,
whether a jurisdiction follows Frye or Daubert, scientific opinion testi-
mony will be inadmissible without a showing of general acceptance,
thereby demonstrating reliability"
It is not clear whether Daubert also supplies the standard for non-
scientific expert testimony."" In dicta, the Court in Daubert noted
134. See id. at 590.
135. See id. at 593-95. The Court stated that the trial court must preliminarily assess scien-
tific validity of the principles underlying the expert scientific testimony, including testability,
peer review, potential error rates, and the general acceptance of the theory. See id. Although
Rule 702, and not 701, was at issue in Daubert, some have argued that the Daubert principles are
relevant to discerning the admissibility of lay opinion testimony as well. SeeAsplundh Mfg. Div.
v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding thatDaubert counsels
judges to screen lay opinion testimony where it closely resembles expert testimony). But see G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 969-70 (1996) ("[I1f the lay witness requires special knowledge or ex-
perience, is not that witness really an expert witness? ... Daubert does not apply to the decision
whether a lay witness is competent to testify.").
136. SeeJames R McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock
and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 402 n.287 (noting that some states have adopted the
Daubert standard while others have retained the Fryestandard of general acceptance).
137. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). UnderFrye, the court
must determine if the method relied upon is generally accepted in the scientific community.
See id.
138. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in
ruling particular evidence admissible.").
139. See Maiorana v. National Gypsum Co., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[R]ight after abolishing [Frye's 'general acceptance' test], Daubert reaffirms its validity."
(citing Hao-Nhien Q. Vu & Richard A. Tamor, OfDaubert, Elvis and Precedential Relevance: Live
Sightings of a Dead Legal Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 487, 500 (1993))); see also Hon. Martin L.C.
Feldman, May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?, 69 TUL. L. REV. 793, 805 (1995).
140. See 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 125, § 353, at 668 ("Daubert brings scope
problems by leaving open the possibility that not all expertise represents 'science,' and that
other kinds of expertise are subject to other standards, and this possibility connects with deci-
sions that exempt analyses resting on expertise but not expressly on scientific theory from any
validity standard."). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explicitly held
that the reliability and relevance requirements of Daubert apply to all expert opinion evidence.
See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that, as discussed in
Daubert, the federal judges' "gatekeeper" function is applicable to all expert testimony). Sev-
eral other circuits have disagreed. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that Daubert only provides a method for evaluating reliability of witnesses who claim
scientific expertise); In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co.,
52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Daubert addressed admissibility and left un-
changed traditional sufficiency standard); Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270
n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (limiting Daubert to evaluation of scientific expert testimony).
Commentators disagree as to whether and to what extent the standards articulated in
Daubert are applicable to cases involving nonscientific expert testimony. Some commentators
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that Rule 702 was not limited to novel scientific evidence.14 ' How-
ever, as noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in part, the
Court failed to state whether the Daubert opinion encompassed ex-
pert testimony on the basis of "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge" under Rule 702.42 Nevertheless, relevance and reliability are
desirable qualities for any kind of evidence, and there can be little
doubt that those requirements apply to all cases of expert testi-
mony.'m Thus, under both the common law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, nonscientific expert testimony is admissible only if reliable,
a principle reaffirmed by the Court in Daubert.'"
Even where opinion testimony is admissible under Rules 701 and
702, such testimony remains subject to the general considerations of
Rule 403.* Rule 403 permits a court to exclude relevant evidence
when its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.' '4 6 Thus, expert opinion evidence that is
argue that the Daubert analysis requiring the court to look to several factors to assess the credi-
bility of the evidence, see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95, is inappropriate when applied to nonsci-
entific evidence. See Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The Limitations ofDaubert and its Misapplication to
Quasi-Scientyfic Experts, a Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 140-44 (1995). Other commentators have noted that
the dicta in Daubert affirmatively requires that all expert testimony satisfy both of the more gen-
eral "knowledge" and "helpfulness/fit" requirements. SeeJay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Sci-
entific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2027 (1996). Others contend that the
rules of evidence relied upon by the Court in Daubert, see FED. I EVID. 403, 702, 703 and 706,
apply to all experts, and the fact that Daubert discusses them in the context of scientific expert
testimony does not affect the applicability of the opinion to nonscientific contexts. See Fenner,
supra note 135, at 968-69.
Professor Imwinkelried has concluded that the Court in Daubert explicitly confined its
holding to scientific evidence, but "it is imperative that the courts develop standards forvalidat-
ing nonscientific expert testimony" to ensure the reliability of such testimony. See Edward J.
lmwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensur-
ing the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2273-74 (1994).
141. SeeDaubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11 ("[W]e do not read the requirements of rule 702 to
apply specifically or exclusively to unconventional evidence.").
142. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Does all this
dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowl-
edge'-the other types of expert knowledge to which rule 702 applies-or are the general ob-
servations limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?").
143. See id. at 589 (asserting that trial judge ensures that any scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is both relevant and reliable). "Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in
the case is irrelevant and therefore, is non-helpful." Id. at 591 (quoting 4JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARETA. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'SFEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.03[4] (2d ed. 1997)). Indeed, un-
der Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
144. "'[T]he rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by
the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact'
is a 'most pervasive manifestation' of the common law insistence upon 'the most reliable
sources of information."' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91 n.9 (citations omitted).
145. SeeFED. R. EVID. 403.
146. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 defines "unfair prejudice" as "an un-
due tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
1998] IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 581
otherwise admissible may still be excluded under Rule 403. The con-
cern of unfair prejudice is particularly acute in the case of expert tes-
timony because of the aura of reliability incident to the testimony of
experts. 47 Expert scientific testimony which is of dubious validity,
and thus limited probative value, may be excluded under Rule 403
because expert testimony maintains the appearance of reliability to
the jury.48
B. Traditional Methods of Identification of Controlled Substances
Traditionally, the identity of a controlled substance has been
proven by several methods, including chemical analysis, field tests,
testimony of drug users and circumstantial evidence, as well as visual
identification of marijuana.4 The cases reflect an insistence that the
method the expert proposes to use be reliable.
1. Chemical analysis
The most reliable method is through a laboratory chemical analy-
sis of the substance in question.' A laboratory report or expert tes-
timony concerning chemical testing of a controlled substance is di-
rect evidence as to the nature of the substance. As such, absent any
other evidence, courts may place significant weight on whether a
laboratory report was admitted into evidence. 5' Indeed, many states
emotional one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
147. See4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 143, § 702.03(4] ("Expert testimony that is more
prejudicial than probative is inadmissible under Rule 403."); see also United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Because of its apparent objectivity, an opinion that claims scien-
tific basis is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.").
148. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("'Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite mis-
leading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing
possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more
control over experts than over lay witnesses.'" (quotingJack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.RLD. 631, 632 (1991))); see also Nossel,
supra note 120, at 238 (finding courts likely to exclude expert scientific testimony because of
unfair prejudice stemming from its "aura of reliability" when courts are skeptical about its valid-
ity and helpfulness to the jury).
149. See State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142, 146-48 (Neb. 1989) (discussing factors to be con-
sidered in determining identity of controlled substance).
150. See State v. Northrup, 825 P.2d 174, 182 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he most reliable
and least controversial method of proving the identity of a substance is a reliable chemical
analysis of that substance.... [C]hemical evidence is preferable [to circumstantial evi-
dence]"); see also State v.Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Wisc. 1972) (finding that"[w]hile a
chemical analysis may be the more scientific test to determine the nature of a drug," circum-
stantial evidence may be used where no testing is possible because the substance had been in-
gested).
151. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 543 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
evidence was insufficient to show defendant sold heroin where no chemical test was introduced
and field test was inadequate); In reJ.W., 597 So. 2d 1056, 1058-59 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that evidence was insufficient to support conviction of distribution of cocaine where no labora-
tory report was admitted into evidence identifying the substance); see also infra note 157
(outlining cases in which chemical analysis alone was held sufficient to prove beyond a reason-
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have enacted legislation mandating that a certified laboratory report
indicating the chemical nature of a controlled substance serve as
prima facie evidence of the identity of the substance.152 Typically,
however, the prosecution presents a witness, usually a state forensic
chemist, to testify as to the identity of the substance.
The admissibility of such testimony falls within the ambit of Fed-
eral Rule 702. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., a
chemist's testimony about the chemical composition of a particular
substance is clearly "'scientific ... knowledge' ... ground[ed] in the
methods and procedures of science."'5 3 Assuming that the opinion is
offered by a qualified expert, the requirements of Rule 702 are easily
satisfied; the subject matter of the testimony is helpful to the jury,
54
and the evidentiary reliability of chemical tests identifying controlled
substances required under Frye or Daubert is satisfied.'
As such, courts uniformly admit into evidence chemical analyses of
a controlled substance, 6 and regularly find such evidence sufficient
able doubt that the substance was an illicit controlled substance).
152. Admission of laboratory reports as evidence of the identity of a controlled substance
has been contested on the grounds of inadmissible hearsay and as a constitutional violation of
the confrontation clause. Both arguments have uniformly failed. Chemical analysis reports
have been held to come under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that laboratory reports
identifying substance as cocaine base were admissible under business records exception); Peo-
ple v. Tsombanidis, 601 N.E.2d 1124, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (concluding that reports on
chemical analysis of substance were admissible under business records exception to the hearsay
rule). Further, "firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the Confrontation
Clause." See Roulette, 75 F.3d at 422 (quoting United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1360 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
153. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
154. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevance as "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
155. See United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that reliability
may be demonstrated by satisfying Frye's "widespread acceptance" standard); People v. Green,
626 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 1995) (police chemist testimony regarding quantitative analysis
of drugs admissible where chemist stated that procedure was generally accepted in profession
as reliable and chemist's credentials qualified chemist as expert).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding admissable
chemist's expert testimony identifying substance as heroin because it relied on "standards" de-
termined by other chemists); Bynum, 3 F.3d at 772-73 (concluding that chemist's chroma-
tographic analysis was admissible because defendant did not show chromatography as unreli-
able or not generally accepted in scientific community); Willis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 417, 418
(Ark. 1992) (allowing laboratory report on identity of substance because it was attested to by a
chemist); People v. Mazzella, 577 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that chemist's
opinion identifying substance was admissible, and that defendant's argument that the chemist
did not test the substance against a known standard was without merit);see also People v. Paik,
628 N.E.2d 1140, 1147 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that chemist was not required to independ-
ently determine the reliability of substance standards used for comparison to substance at is-
sue); Bell v. State, 503 A.2d 1351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that chemist's testimony
was properly admitted where drugs themselves were not admitted into evidence); People v.
McTootle, 602 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that chemical test, which otherwise
would have been inadmissible due to failure to test known standard, was admissible in conjunc-
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as to the identity of the substance to uphold a conviction.'57 How-
ever, although a chemical analysis of the controlled substance for
which a defendant is being prosecuted arguably provides the most
accurate determination of the identity of the substance" 8 and ven-
tures minimal risk of prejudicial effect, for a variety of reasons
chemical tests are sometimes unavailable at trial.' 9 In such circum-
stances, prosecutors have used several alternative methods of proving
the identity of a controlled substance as an essential element of the
crime.
2. Police field tests
Law enforcement officers commonly conduct "field tests" of sub-
stances when preparing to make an arrest for drug offenses.' 60 On
occasion, where other evidence is unavailable, the prosecution may
seek to rely on field-test results to establish the nature of the sub-
stance.'61 Courts are divided on both the admissibility and sufficiency
of such evidence.'
62
tion with expert testimony).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
chemist's report was sufficient to support conviction for cocaine base); United States v. John-
son, 12 F.3d 760, 766 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that forensic chemist's testimony adequately
demonstrated that substance was cocaine); United States v. Gaulteau, 4 F.3d 1003, 1004 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (finding that qualified expert's testimony that substance was cocaine base was suffi-
cient); Emerson v. State, 469 S.E.2d 520, 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that forensic chemist
testimony regarding tests on marijuana was sufficient); State v. Givens, 917 S.W.2d 215, 217
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that forensic chemist's testimony that substance was cocaine was
sufficient).
158. See People v. Newberry, 652 N.E.2d 288, 292 (I1. 1995) (acknowledging that despite
possibility that reliability of lab tests might not be great, "the jury will undoubtedly give such
[chemical] analysis more deference than the initial field test procedures, which are inherently
less precise and controlled."); State v. Northrup, 825 P.2d 174, 182 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)
("[T]he most reliable and least controversial method of proving the identity of a substance is a
reliable chemical analysis of that substance."); State v. Fletcher, 373 S.E.2d 681, 686 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) ("Admittedly, it would have been better for the state to have introduced evidence of
chemical analysis of the substance."); State v. Anderson, 500 N.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that "[w]hile a chemical analysis may be a more scientific test to determine the
nature of a drug" the court may rely on circumstantial evidence when no such test is available).
159. For instance, the substance may have been ingested, disposed of, or destroyed before
the police could acquire possession and perform a chemical analysis. SeeState v.Johnson, 196
N.W.2d 717, 720 (Wis. 1972) (adopting position that when chemical analysis is not possible be-
cause substance was ingested, the court may rely on drug user's testimony).
160. A "field test" is a test utilized by police officers outside a laboratory for the purpose of
affirming that a particular substance may be a controlled substance. Typically, field tests used
by officers are merely indicative and not conclusive of the presence of a narcotic substance, yet
they are admitted into evidence as relevant to whether the substance contains a narcotic drug.
See United States v. Blotcher, No. 95-5590, 1996 WL 442882, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996)(allowing officer who conducted field test to testify to results of such a test because it was reli-
able, customarily used by police, and tended to confirm presence of cocaine).
161. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1425-26 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(stating that field tests are accepted, reliable and sufficient to establish reliability of an infor-
mant).
162. Courts are divided specifically on whether field tests constitute "scientific" evidence.
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There seems to be little doubt that a field test must be reliable to
be admissible. '6s Some courts have found positive field tests in and of
themselves to be reliable and sufficient evidence for a jury to deter-
mine that a substance was a controlled substance.' Others hold that
field tests may be sufficient to arrest or charge,'6 but cannot provide
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.66 The thread that explains these
inconsistent results is a concern for reliability of the particular test
under the circumstances in which it is offered.
3. Drug user testimony
Courts permit users of illicit substances to identify those substances
with which they are familiar. 67 Although courts differ as to whether
Some courts have concluded that "a field test cannot be elevated to 'scientific' evidence by the
testimony of an expert." Smith v. State, 874 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); see also Wilson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 270, 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
field test admitted into evidence for limited purpose of establishing chain of custody of evi-
dence is not scientific evidence). Other courts hold that a field test of controlled substances is
.scientific" evidence and subject to the applicable rules of admissibility. See Blotcher, 1996 WL
442882, at *6-7 (analyzing admissibility of field test as scientific evidence underDaubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)); United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (admitting field test under Rule 702); Galbraith v. Commonwealth, 446
S.E.2d 633, 637 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (predicating admissibility of field test on state criteria of
reliability). Thus, any expert opinion testimony regarding field test results must satisfy the re-
quirements of Rule 702 or its state equivalent. See Blotcher, 1996 WL 442882, at *6-7; Galbraith,
446 S.E.2d at 637.
163. See L.R. v. State, 557 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting that evidence
was insufficient where officer testified that substance field tested for cocaine, but officer was
unable to testify as to the reliability of the field test).
164. See, e.g., 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. at 1425 (holding that field test was suffi-
cient to establish reliability of informant); People v. $1,002.00, 572 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) ("A positive field test has been found sufficient to establish that a substance is a nar-
cotic under both the preponderance of evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt standards of
proof."); People v. Vazquez, 535 N.E.2d 981,986 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (maintaining that field test
was sufficient to establish that substance was a narcotic); Houston v. State, 553 N.E.2d 117, 119
(Ind. 1990) (affirming that field test alone was sufficient to establish that a substance was mari-
juana).
As noted, it is unclear whether field tests are examined under standard measures of admissi-
bility for "scientific evidence." See generally People v. Swamp, 646 N.E.2d 774, 779 (N.Y. 1995)
(Smith,J., dissenting) ("There is no showing here that the field test was generally accepted as
reliable under Frye v. United States... [A] single [field] test may or may not yield a valid result
and... a complete laboratory analysis is required for a qualitative conclusion.").
165. See Swamp, 646 N.E.2d at 777-78 (clarifying that field test is sufficient for indictment
but does not satisfy "beyond reasonable doubt" standard for trial).
166. SeeWeaver v. State, 543 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that field test
was insufficient where officer could not remember name of test and did not know whether it
was reliable); People v. Brightman, 565 N.Y.S.2d 989, 992-93 (Crim. Ct. 1991) (holding that
field test was insufficient to form basis of prosecution for drug possession charges); State v.
Jackson, 468 N.W.2d 431, 431 (Wis. 1991) (stating that field test results were sufficient for
probable cause, but not sufficient for proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
167. See State v. Saez, 845 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a majority of
jurisdictions have recognized that drug abusers or addicts may possess sufficient qualifications
to testify about matters at issue in narcotics prosecutions); accord Commonwealth v. Dawson,
504 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (Mass. 1987) (noting that great weight of authority in this country per-
mits an experienced user of a controlled substance to testify that a substance he saw and used
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such testimony is that of a lay witness or an expert witness,m the most
reasonable view maintains that such testimony is that of an expert
witness because it is based on specialized experience," rather than
ordinary perceptions."' Even in cases where a witness is permitted to
testify as a lay witness under Federal Rule 701, the witness qualifies to
testify based on particular experience with a specific substance.
Thus, courts permitting such testimony under Federal Rule 701 con-
tinue to require that the testimony be reliable. In United States v.
Paiva, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that a witness, unqualified as an expert witness, could
probably testify as a lay witness based on her vast prior experience
and dependence on cocaine.1
Courts exclude testimony where the witness's experience with a
drug are inadequate to prove expertise.'73 The greater the extent of
the witness's expert qualifications, however, the broader the scope of
was a particular drug).
For a discussion of earlier cases permitting drug user testimony, see generallyJ. Allison De-
Foor 11, Consumer Testimony as Proof of Identity of the Controlled Substance in a Narcotics Case, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 682 (1981).
168. Compare State v. Saez, 845 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (qualifying witness as
expert on identification of cocaine based on experience with and personal knowledge of co-
caine's appearance, packaging, price, effect, and method of ingesting), with United States v.
Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing that although drug user may not qualify as
expert witness, drug user may be competent, based on past experience and personal knowl-
edge, to qualify as lay witness that particular substance was cocaine or some other drug).
169. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise." Id.
170. See FED. R. EVID. 701. Rule 701 states that "[i]f the witness is not testifying as an ex-
pert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or infer-
ences which are (a) rationally based on the perception the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Id.
171. SeePaiva, 892 F.2d at 155-56.
172. See id. at 155-57. It is unclear why the court detailed the witness's experience and
qualifications to testify given that Federal Rule 701 requires nothing more than the opinions of
the witness to be based on personal knowledge, rational, and helpful to the jury. See FED. R.
EVID. 701; see also Moon v. State, 560 N.E.2d 76, 77 (Ind. CL App. 1990) (holding that witnesses
were permitted to testify that substance was cocaine based on frequent and extensive personal
use of cocaine).
Other courts have held that the qualifications of a lay witness go to the weight and not the
admissibility of the evidence. See State v. Rubio, 798 P.2d 206, 208 (N.M. CtL App. 1990)
(permitting cocaine dealer to testify as a lay witness that substance was cocaine).
173. SeePeople v. McLean, 365 P.2d 403, 405 (Cal. 1961) (holding that witness who smoked
what she believed to be marijuana on about seven occasions was not qualified to distinguish
between tobacco and marijuana); In re Waylon M., 181 Cal. Rptr. 413, 414 (Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that witness was unqualified to testify due to inexperience in identifying narcotics and
lack of background or knowledge regarding narcotics); People v. Kenny, 282 N.E.2d 295,296
(N.Y. 1972) (holding that witness was not qualified to identify marijuana where the witness only
had two experiences with the drug); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 50 (W. Va. 1979) (holding
that high school student was unqualified to identify joints as marijuana, despite past experience
with smoking marijuana, due to "complete absence of any objective factors or any special fa-
miliarity with the substance").
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permissible testimony a court will allow. An extreme example ap-
pears in United States v. Johnson,'74 where a witness who had been ex-
posed to marijuana a "great deal," and had smoked it over one thou-
sand times, was permitted to testify as to the foreign source of the
marijuana in question.' 7
A witness may be qualified as an expert based on past experience
with a substance, yet still be prevented from testifying because the
testimony is not reliable. Such was the case in Copeland v. State, 76 in
which a drug addict was qualified as an expert, but the identification
of the drug in question was held unreliable because the drug was
identified by sight, and no other testimony corroborated how the
witness identified the substance.'7
4. Opinion testimony based on circumstantial evidence
Qualified experts or laypersons78 often testify in drug prosecutions
to illuminate otherwise mysterious behavior or speech used by ac-
cused drug criminals. Without assistance, many jurors would find it
difficult to understand the code language used by dealers,79 the
process of preparing and packaging drug materials,'8 the record-
keeping of drug dealers, 8' and whether a quantity of a given con-
trolled substance was consistent with personal use or was more likely
intended for distribution. 8 2 Officers qualify as experts in such areas
by way of their "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"
under Federal Rule 7 02.ss An officer may testify, for instance, that
174. 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978).
175. See id. at 1360-61. But seePedraza v.Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to
allow witness to give lay or expert testimony regarding heroin withdrawal despite thirty years of
addiction).
176. 430 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
177. See id. at 396.
178. See State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142 (Neb. 1989) (allowing inexperienced user to tes-
tify as witness to physical attributes, characterizing terms, and preparation and effect of the sub-
stance).
179. See United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1993) (permitting expert
testimony regarding drug trade jargon).
180. See United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1261 (7th Cir. 1996) (qualifying Drug En-
forcement Agent with twenty-four years experience under Federal Rule 702 to testify about use
of inositol powder, plastic baggies and other paraphernalia); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d
1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to formally qualify officer as expert, but permitting testi-
mony as to use of coffee beans in drug smuggling based on his prior investigation experience).
181. See United States v. Eschverri, 982 F.2d 675, 680 (1st Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that
trial court may allow a law enforcement officer to identify an otherwise incomprehensible
document as a drug ledger and explain its contents).
182. United States v. Watson, No. 94-3413, 1995 WL 628114, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 26, 1995)
(finding that officer with several years experience as an undercover narcotics agent had suffi-
cient expertise to testify that possession of a certain amount of cocaine was evidence of the in-
tent to distribute).
183. FED. R EVID. 702.
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crack cocaine was intended for distribution rather than personal use
because it was packaged in separate wrappers.'4 An officer may be
qualified to give such an expert opinion under Federal Rule 702 due
to several years of undercover narcotics experience involving numer-
ous purchases of crack cocaine.8 5 Thus, an officer's experience and
training provide a reliable basis from which he or she may render an
opinion.
Based in part on these cases, lay8 6 and expert1 87 opinion testimony
is sometimes used to identify a suspected substance. Many jurisdic-
tions have held that circumstantial evidence is admissible and, some-
times, sufficient to identify an illicit controlled substance.'ss Such cir-
cumstantial evidence typically takes the form of evidence regarding
the "secretiveness of the transaction[,] references made to the drug
by the defendant and others.... testimony by witnesses who have a
significant amount of experience with the drug in question,... be-
havior characteristics of sale and use of a particular substance,...
and prior involvement by the defendant in drug trafficking."
8 9
184. See Watson, 1995 WL 628114, at *2 (thirteen separate containers).
185. See id.
186. For examples of lay opinion testimony, see United States v. Brown, 887 F.2d 537, 542
(5th Cir. 1989) (allowing lay witness testimony as to experience in identifying cocaine);
Chancey v. State, 349 S.E.2d 717, 725 (Ga. 1986) (admitting testimony of lay witness who saw
defendant use white powdery substance in manner consistent with cocaine); and, Swain v.
State, 805 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (finding lay witness testimony sufficient to
support determination that defendant possessed marijuana, even though no witness who testi-
fied that substance appeared to be marijuana was qualified as an expert).
187. For examples of expert witness testimony, see United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d
1271, 1282 & n.45 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing well-established rule that an experienced narcotics
agent may testify as an expert with respect to methods of operation unique to the drug trade);
United States v. Almada-Aldama, 462 F.2d 952, 952 (9th Cir. 1972) (qualifying a U.S. Customs
Agent as an expert due to extensive experience with marijuana) and State v. Stahl, 482 N.W.2d
829, 834 (Neb. 1992) (holding that police officer was an expert by virtue of training and expe-
rience).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Crisp,
563 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977);Jenkins v. State, 248 So. 2d 758 (Ala. Crim. App. 1971); Winters
v. State, 646 P.2d 867 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Cunningham, 497 P.2d 821 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972); People v. McLean, 365 P.2d 403 (Cal. 1961); People v. Edwards, 598 P.2d 126 (Colo.
1979); A.A. v. State, 461 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Schofill, 621 P.2d 364
(Haw. 1980); People v. Robinson, 153 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 1958); Warthan v. State, 440 N.E.2d 657
(Ind. 1982); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1972); People v. Boyd, 236 N.W.2d
744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Kerfoot, 658 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dunn,
664 P.2d 893 (Mont. 1970); State v. Pipkin, 245 A.2d 72 (NJ. 1968); People v. Kenny, 282
N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1972); Cory v. State, 543 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Commonwealth v.
Leskovic, 307 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Commonwealth v. Aikens, 118 A.2d 205 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1955); Miller v. State, 330 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959); State v. Hutton, 502 P.2d
1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Hailer, 363 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1987).
189. State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Neb. 1989) (internal citations omitted). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarized circumstantial evidence that
may be relied upon to establish that a substance was a controlled substance:
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In the context of identifying a controlled substance, however, some
caution is warranted in treating circumstantial evidence as sufficient.
Every circumstance incident to a sale of narcotics offered to identify
the narcotic may be present in a sale of imitation substances. A seller
of imitation drugs, committing a fraud upon the buyer, must repre-
sent that the substance in question is a genuine illicit substance.
Thus, the transaction will entail all the same circumstances incident
to a sale of genuine illicit substances, including price, secrecy of the
transaction, and utilization of descriptive terms.'o On its own, such
evidence indicates that the substance was genuine as much as it indi-
cates that the substance was an imitation. This "as likely as" level of
probativeness fails even a preponderance standard, let alone the re-
quired evidentiary showing of the identity of the substance beyond a
reasonable doubt.
As a result, courts that admit this kind of evidence remain con-
cerned about questions of reliability. In Provo City Corp. v. Spotts,"'
for example, the court determined that testimony showing that the
substance in question was used as an illicit drug, appeared to be an
illicit drug, and smelled like marijuana was the "outer limit of what
[the court] would affirm for a possession case where the substance
itself or a chemical data test was not produced.
1 92
5. Visual identiflcation of marijuana
Although a chemical test is more reliable, a police officer's identi-
fication of marijuana may serve as a substitute provided that the po-
lice officer is qualified to render such an expert opinion, and that the
identification is reliable. Marijuana, compared to other controlled
substances, is particularly amenable to visual identification.
Marijuana, not being an extract or preparation difficult or impossi-
ble to characterize without chemical analysis, but consisting of the
dried leaves, stems, and seeds of a plant which anyone reasonably
familiar therewith should be able to identify by appearance, it is
The substance had the appearance of illicit cocaine; when sampled and tested by an
experienced user of cocaine, it had the effect of cocaine; the price paid for the sub-
stance was "high"; its sale and delivery were conducted furtively and with deviousness;
and finally, all persons dealing with the substance treated it and dealt with it as co-
caine.
United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1980).
190. See People v. Watkins, 526 N.E.2d 448, 448-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). In Watkins, under-
cover officers purchased two tin-foil packets of tan powder through burglar gates guarding the
apartment door. The packets were produced upon the officer's request for two"dime-bags" of
heroin, which were exchanged for twenty dollars, the going rate. Subsequent chemical analysis
later determined that the tan powder was not a controlled substance. See id.
191. 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
192. Id. at 443.
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not error to permit officers who have had experience in searching
for and obtaining marijuana to testify that a certain substance is
marijuana; and other police officers have also been held qualified
so to testify.
193
Thus, like all other expert testimony, a police officer must first
qualify to give such testimony. In State v. Stahl'9 4 an undercover po-
lice officer was qualified to testify that a substance was marijuana
based on his twenty hours of training in drug identification, on an
additional 100 hours of training in criminal investigation received
over the course of his career, and on his participation in drug inves-
tigations and coordination of state drug control efforts.'9 5 Likewise,
in United States v. Almada-Aldama,'6 the Ninth Circuit held that a cus-
toms agent who had seen bricks of marijuana on numerous occa-
sions, had been trained to identify marijuana, and had never been
mistaken in visually identifying marijuana, could identify the sub-
stance. 97 Conversely, an officer not sufficiently trained in identifying
marijuana should not be permitted to testify as an expert. Thus, in
People v. Park,'98 the court held that a deputy sheriffs testimony that a
substance was in fact marijuana should not have been admitted
where the officer lacked training in identifying the substance."
The rules of evidence aside, good reason exists as to why an officer
must be qualified as an expert to testify that a substance is marijuana.
As explicated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Park, the potential
rate of erroneous identification of marijuana is significant-almost
fifteen percent.2 The court stated, "[a]t the very least...
[identification is] highly prone to error in the hands of anyone but
an expert."2' Another observer has estimated the error rate in mari-
juana identification to be as high as twenty percent."2
In sum, all of the established methods of identification of a con-
trolled substance reflect the new flexibility regarding opinion testi-
mony. At the same time, cases show that courts will not admit any
conceivable opinion a party wishes to offer. To the contrary, the de-
193. Willoughby v. Marucci, No. 92-L-186, 1993 WL 410014, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
1993) (citing State v. Maupin, 330 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ohio 1975)).
194. 482 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 1992).
195. See id. at 834.
196. 462 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1972).
197. See id. at 952.
198. 380 N.E.2d 795 (IIl. 1978).
199. See id. at 797.
200. See id. at 799.
201. Id. at 798. The court based its skepticism of morphological identification of marijuana
on statistics from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory that demonstrated that only 14.4% of
samples of suspected marijuana in fact were not marijuana. See id.
202. See Kurzman & Fullerton, supra note 41.
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cisions continue to reflect a traditional concern for reliability of opin-
ion testimony without which evidence must be excluded.
C. Visual Identification of White Powders
1. Expertise
To qualify a police officer as an expert in identifying controlled
substances under Federal Rule 702, the trial court must determine
that the education or experience of an officer fairly matches the sub-
ject matter of the proposed testimony.203 At first glance, qualifying an
officer as an expert in identifying white powders may appear to be
the logical extension of the expertise of an officer in other narcotics-
related areas. For example, it may seem logical to determine that an
officer who, by training and experience, qualifies to testify as to the
identity of any controlled substance based on the circumstances sur-
rounding a drug transaction or an arrest, or to testify that a vegetable
matter is marijuana based on the officer's visual inspection of the
substance, may also qualify to testify that a white powder is cocaine or
heroin based upon visual inspection of the substance. Likewise, if an
experienced user of a particular drug may qualify to testify as to the
identity of a substance based on experience with that substance, it
may seem that an officer with years of experience in narcotics should
qualify to testify to the identity of the substance as well. Although po-
lice officers possess experience and training that enables them to
identify any controlled substance by the circumstances surrounding a
transaction or to identify a controlled substance such as marijuana by
visual inspection, police officers possess no such experience and
training that enables them to identify a controlled substance such as
heroin or cocaine by visual inspection.
Courts routinely permit police officers to testify that, based on the
circumstances surrounding a transaction or an arrest, the substance
which was the subject of that transaction was likely to be a particular
controlled substance.0 The officer typically is qualified to render
such expert opinion testimony based on experience and training.
When an officer testifies based on the circumstances surrounding an
arrest or transaction that a substance is a particular controlled sub-
stance, an officer is stating his opinion based upon inferences from
those circumstances. 5 It is critical to recognize, however, that the
203. See 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 106, § 1923.
204. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
205. See State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Neb. 1989) (holding that circumstances sur-
rounding arrest constituted sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
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officer here is properly qualified an expert on circumstances sur-
rounding an arrest or transaction-not on the chemical composition
of the substance itself.
Likewise, experienced users of narcotic substances are regularly
qualified to give expert testimony as to the identity of a particular
substance which they have used."' Courts typically qualify the user as
an expert based on prior use of the substance and resultant familiar-
ity with the effects of the substance when ingested.2 8 When a drug
user gives expert opinion testimony as to the identity of a substance
based on his experience ingesting the particular substance, the drug
user infers the identity of the substance based on the effects of the
substance when ingested.2 9 Thus, the drug user is properly qualified
as an expert on the effects of a particular substance when ingested-
not on the chemical composition or appearance of the substance it-
self.
The cases in which a substance is identified visually or by chemical
analysis, however, are distinct from both the cases of expert police
identification of controlled substances based on the circumstances
surrounding a transaction or arrest, and user identification of a con-
trolled substance based on the effects of that substance when in-
gested. Although in the latter cases the witness is actually testifying to
some attribute external to the substance itself from which the identity
of the substance may be inferred in the former cases the witness is
testifying to the chemical composition of the substance itself. Wit-
nesses in the latter category who testify to external attributes of the
substance are qualified to do so based on experience or training re-
garding those attributes. It follows that a witness testifying to the
chemical composition of the substance be qualified to do so based on
education, training or experience relating specifically to recognition
of the chemical composition of the substance.
The courts often qualify police officers as experts to testify that a
vegetable matter is marijuana, based on visual inspection. 2"0  These
cases differ from the cases of officers testifying to the identity of con-
trolled substances based on the circumstances, or of drug users testi-
206. See United States v. Nelson, No. 89-10040, 1990 WL 177963, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 14,
1990) (holding that DEA agent's testimony as to the nature of the chemical substance was
proper).
207. Seesupra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
208. See id. Conversely, where the experience of a witness with a drug is too brief to render
the witness sufficiently familiar with the effects of the drug, the witness will not be permitted to
testify. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
209. See United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 155 (1989) (holding that lay witness could tes-
tify as to identity of substance after tasting it).
210. See supra Part III.B.5.
THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:557
fying based on the effects of a substance when ingested. An officer
may be qualified as an expert to testify that a substance is marijuana
by merely looking at it based on years of experience and training that
presumably render the officer very familiar with the distinctive physi-
cal properties of marijuana. 1 Indeed, it is only possible for an offi-
cer to gain such expertise because of the distinctive physical attrib-
utes of marijuana.2 1 2 The officer therefore is properly qualified as an
expert on discerning the distinctive physical properties of marijuana.
In contrast, while police officers are typically qualified to testify as
experts in narcotics trafficking and may be found to have expertise in
identifying marijuana, they are not usually qualified to testify as ex-
perts in chemical analysis. t Police officers usually do not have ad-
vanced degrees in science, are not trained in the chemical properties
of a substance, and do not perform laboratory analyses of substances.
In contrast to the identification of marijuana, it is impossible for an
officer to visually discern the identity of powdered substances, be-
cause white powdery substances are not visually distinguishable. 4
Thus, no amount of experience or training would qualify a police of-
ficer to testify as to the identity of those white powdery substances.
Not surprisingly, in the years before the drug war, several courts
recognized that police officers are not experts in distinguishing white
powdery substances by sight.215 For example, in Berkovich v. Hicksv 16 -
a false arrest and imprisonment case-the trial court excluded plain-
tiffs offer of expert testimony on the distinctions between the tastes
of cocaine and Nutrasweet e 7 because "such testimony could have un-
211. Compare State v. Stahl, 482 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Neb. 1992) (holding that undercover po-
lice officer was qualified as an expert to identify marijuana on basis of receiving twenty hours of
training in drug identification and 100 additional hours of training in criminal investigation),
with People v. Park, 380 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ill. 1978) (ruling that deputy sheriff who had not
been trained in marijuana identification was not qualified to testify as an expert).
212. SeeBERNHE!M, supra note 52, § 4.01, at 4-6 (noting that courts have upheld marijuana-
related convictions for offenses in which the sole evidence of the contraband was the opinion
testimony of the police officers qualified as experts).
213. See United States v. Nelson, No. 89-10040, 1990 WL 177963, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 14,
1990) (holding that police officer witness qualifies as an expert in narcotics trafficking but not
chemical drug analysis).
214. "[W]e are unwilling to say that an experienced officer can look at a white or brown
powdered substance and testify that it is heroin since morphine, codeine, paregoric, other opi-
ates, other controlled substances, and non-controlled substances also appear in white or brown
powdered form." Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57,59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
215. See, e.g., State v. Symmonds, 310 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ill. 1974) (stating that"even an ex-
pert cannot positively identify heroin or distinguish it from another white powdery substance
solely by visual inspection"); People v. Williams, 185 N.E.2d 686, 687 (I1. 1962) (holding that
only an expert could identify the white powder as a narcotic); Curtis, 548 S.W.2d at 59
(expressing unwillingness to state that an experienced officer can look at a substance and tes-
tify that it is a controlled substance).
216. 922 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1991).
217. Seeid. at1024.
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fairly prejudiced the [officers] by creating the misleading inference
that police officers are required to differentiate white powdery sub-
stances with the skill of an expert."'218
2. Reliability and helpfulness to the trier offact
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness may qualify as an
expert on a particular subject and render opinion testimony on that
subject provided that the testimony will assist the trier of fact and is
reliable.29 As noted, the federal rule embodies the "skilled witness"
exception to the common law rule against opinion testimony, yet is
applied more flexibly than its common law predecessor.2 ' Despite its
flexibility, the federal rule continues to delineate boundaries of ad-
missibility that maintain the common law requisites of helpfulness
and reliability. Although the Rule has been interpreted broadly to
permit police expert opinion testimony on a range of subjects,2
permitting police identification of visually indistinguishable con-
trolled substances such as heroin and cocaine under the guise of ex-
pertise eviscerates the standards of admissibility under the Rule.
Police officers should not offer expert opinion testimony based on
visual identification of a controlled substance because of the unreli-
ability of such evidence. Indeed, the rate of error in police identifi-
cation of controlled substances is upwards of sixty percent.22 4 The
case law does not make clear upon what basis the officer is able to
render his expert opinion regarding the identity of the substance,
other than the officer's experience and training. However, as noted,
police officers are not trained in nor do they perform chemical
analyses.
The test for the reliability of expert opinion evidence varies de-
pending on whether or not the evidence offered is scientific.2 Al-
218. Id.
219. See supra Part IIlA
220. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (allowing a witness qualified as an expert to give opinion testi-
mony based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, if it will aid the trier of fact
when hearing testimony that is beyond common experience).
221. See supra Part IIIA (comparing the common law rule disallowing opinion testimony
with the liberally applied Federal Rules allowing witnesses to state opinions or draw inferences
when they are rationally based and helpful to the trier of fact).
222. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (asserting that the
trial judge under Federal Rule 702 must ensure that scientific or specialized knowledge allowed
into testimony is relevant, reliable and will assist the trier of fact); FED. R. EvID. 701 advisory
committee's note.
223. See supra Part III.B.4 (offering summary of circumstances in which police have been
permitted to testify as experts in drug prosecutions).
224. See Kurzman & Fullerton, supra note 41, at 523-24.
225. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (reiterating "gatekeeping" factors that a
court should consider in the context of evaluating scientific evidence as established in Daubert).
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though the subject of the police officer's testimony in the instant case
states a scientific conclusion-that the chemical composition of a
powdered substance is consistent with a controlled substance-it is
debatable whether the testimony is itself "scientific knowledge." 6
Expert opinion issuing from "specialized" rather than "scientific"
knowledge must still meet general standards of evidentiary reliabil-
ityYs7 Therefore, for the instant purpose of evaluating police testi-
mony, the arguably less stringent standard22 of evidentiary reliability
will be used. Evidentiary reliability, as distinguished from scientific
reliability, essentially requires that the evidence be trustworthy.
The unreliability of visual identification of suspected controlled
substances means that other requirements of expert opinion testi-
mony are also absent. For example, this form of testimony, if prof-
fered, would be of little use to the trier of fact as required by the
Federal Rule 702.m Under Federal Rule 702, expert testimony is un-
helpful to the trier of fact if it is superfluous (nonrelevant) or if it is
more likely to impede the jury's judgment than to assist the jury's
judgment230 In fact, admitting such testimony more likely may serve
the negative purpose of impeding the jury from exercising its inde-
pendent judgment, because of the credibility a jury will ascribe to a
police expert's testimony.3 '
Identification of an unknown substance based on purportedly spe-
cialized training is a matter for expert testimony.ss Nevertheless,
some courts admit this form of testimony as proper lay testimony.2s
For much the same reasons, lay opinion testimony identifying a sus-
226. See supra Part HIA (discussing whether such testimony is indeed "scientific knowledge"
subject to Daubert analysis).
227. See id.
228. Although the Daubert standard concededly is more complex, involving several
.gatekeeping factors" for the judge to consider, it may be the case that there is no heightened
evidentiary standard that issues from these factors-thatDaubert requires the same degree of
reliability and relevance that nonscientific evidence must possess, but requires a distinct
method for measuring reliability and relevance that is adapted to science.
229. See Imwinkelried, supra note 103, at 248 (noting that theory or principle must "assist
the trier of fact" to be permissible premise for expert testimony and that a theory or principle
of common knowledge therefore is not a permissible premise for expert testimony (citingFED.
R. EVID. 702)).
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See Nossel, supra note 120, at 245 ("The admission of ultimate issue expert testimony
by law enforcement officers risks unfairly prejudicing defendants because of the danger that
the jury will give more credence than is warranted to the testimony."); Phylis Skloot Bam-
berger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 855, 866 (1986) ("A prosecution fact
witness who is converted to a government expert witness is not only endowed with the aura of
special reliability and trustworthiness attributed to all expert witnesses, he is also 'vouched' for
by the prosecution.").
232. See supra Part IA (describing the traditional rule that no expert may offer opinion tes-
timony that a particular substance is narcotic).
233. See supra Part I.B.
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pected controlled substance should be inadmissible as well; there is
no rational basis for the testimony2 and it is not helpful to the trier
of fact.235 Further, a police officer's visual inspection will not satisfy
the personal knowledge requirement implicit in Rule 701.26
3. Probative value and prejudicial effect
Even if admissible, under either Federal Rule 701 or 702, the trial
court, in its discretion, may exclude evidence if the probative value of
the evidence is substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudicial ef-
fect that the evidence would have on the defendant if admitted.237
The case of police visual identification of narcotic substances invaria-
bly should be excluded under this standard.
Probative value is defined as evidence that "tends to prove an is-
sue." As noted earlier, police officers, like any other mortal human
beings, are incapable of reliably identifying the chemical composi-
tion of a white powdered substance by simply looking at such sub-
stance. Without any rational or reliable basis for rendering such an
opinion, little, if any probative value can be ascribed to such testi-
239
mony.
Evidence causes unfair prejudice where it tends to compel a deci-
sion on an improper basis.240 In the instant case, the issue to be de-
cided is whether the substance in question is in fact a narcotic.
Where the sole evidence offered is the testimony of the police officer,
234. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. In the case of police officer testimony con-
cerning the identification of a powdery white substance, the officer's only firsthand knowledge
of the substance is his visual inspection of that substance. Thus, the officer must infer the
chemical composition of the substance from its appearance. The inferential chain of reason-
ing may proceed as follows: cocaine and heroin are white powdery substances; the substance in
question is white and powdery; therefore, the substance is heroin or cocaine. Such reasoning
exceeds rationality as there are endless varieties of white powdery substances, indistinguishable
from controlled substances.
235. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. Rule 701 compels the exclusion of su-
perfluous evidence by requiring that the testimony be helpful to the trier of fact. In other
words, where the jury is capable of drawing their own conclusions, the lay witness's testimony is
unhelpful and thus should not be permitted. Where a white powdery substance alleged to be a
controlled substance is presented before the jury, there is littie reason to believe that an offi-
cer's lay opinion concerning the identity of the substance assists the jury. Provided with infor-
mation as to the appearance of particular controlled substances, the jury could draw their own
conclusions as to the identity of the substance.
236. See Robinson v. State, 702 A.2d 741, 749-50 (Md. 1997) (holding that an officer's mere
perception does not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement).
237. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
238. BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
239. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring relevant evidence to contain value that is not out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
240. See id.
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the jury is asked to decide the issue of chemical composition of a sub-
stance based entirely on the word of an individual who possesses no
competence in establishing chemical composition. In other words,
the jury is asked to decide exclusively based on the credibility of the
officer's testimony.
This circumstance poses the danger that the police officer's testi-
mony will be given undue credibility.241  Commentators have long
recognized the general "aura of reliability" that expert opinion evi-
dence has in front of the jury.24 Because of the potentially unjusti-
fied reliability ascribed to expert testimony, courts caution that "the
basis of... opinion testimony must be carefully scrutinized by the
trial court judge."24s Courts have recognized, for instance, that the
danger may be greater when juries are not given data that the expert
relies on for the conclusive testimony, but rather must rely on the
expert's assertions that the conclusions are accurate.2" Therefore, in
circumstances where "the aura of reliability and trustworthiness that
surrounds scientific evidence outweigh[s] any small aid the expert
testimony m[ay] provide[]," courts have not hesitated in excluding
the testimony.4 5
The usual dangers of unwarranted credibility in front of the jury
that expert testimony poses are exacerbated in cases where the ex-
pert also happens to be a police officer. 6 The potential hazards are
heightened further where an investigating officer serves both as a fact
and expert witness.247 The officer/witness's credibility is in effect le-
gitimized by both the prestige conferred upon the witness by associa-
tion with the government and by the potential implication that the
241. See Nossel, supra note 120, at 241 (arguing that testimony by investigators risks preju-
dice because juries may give such testimony undue credence and use it as substantive evidence
of guilt); see also Bamberger, supra note 231, at 866-69 (suggesting that use of police investiga-
tors as fact and expert witnesses may prejudice the jury to give more weight to the testimony
which, under Federal Rule 403, should be precluded as unfairly prejudicial).
242. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (discussing how scientific
evidence appears objective and thus may carry undue weight with the trier of fact); 4JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 702, 05 (3], 34-35 (2d ed. 1997).
243. Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418,423 (7th Cir. 1993).
244. See United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) (sustaining the district
court's exclusion of expert testimony for lack of data or literature to support expert's assump-
tions); United States v. Fosher, 449 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978) (excluding expert testimony
for lack of proof on whether expert's testimony would analyze specific testimony and be useful
to trier of fact without undue prejudice and confusion).
245. United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381,383 (1st Cir. 1979)).
246. See Nossel, supra note 120, at 245 (explaining that expert opinion testimony is espe-
cially powerful in a criminal trial when the expert is a law enforcement officer).
247. See id. at 245-46 (proposing that this danger is particularly pronounced when an inves-
tigating officer acts both as a factual and expert witness as the knowledge gained by the officer
during the investigation supports the conclusions of the officer); see also Bamberger, supra note
231, at 866 (noting dangers of converting fact witness into expert witness).
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witness is relying on information not presented to the jury.248  The
compounded effect of the investigating officer serving as a
fact/expert witness, and the usual "aura of reliability" surrounding
expert testimony, present a significant risk of causing the jury to
reach a conclusion on an impermissible basis.2'9 Given the substan-
tial potential for unfair prejudice to result in light of the weak, if not
absent, probative value of police controlled substance identification
testimony, such evidence should be excluded under Rule 403.2
°
4. Speculative evidence
The empirical evidence presented here demonstrates that police
officer visual identification of white powdery substances rests on the
officer's conjecture, at best. Further, admitting such evidence re-
quires the jury to speculate as to the possibility of whether the police
officer was correct in identifying the substance. The visual identifica-
tion rule thereby violates one of the basic foundations of evidence
law-speculative evidence is inadmissible.25' The ban on speculative
evidence applies to experts as well as lay witnesses. 22 Courts thus
regularly exclude expert opinion testimony where that testimony is
based on speculation.2 3 Further, the degree of speculation required
to render evidence inadmissible is not substantial. Thus, where a sci-
entist based his conclusions regarding causation in a products liabil-
ity case on a working hypothesis he developed that had not yet been
subjected to peer review, the court excluded the evidence as specula-
tive.2 The "methodology" used by police to identify controlled sub-
248. See Bamberger, supra note 231, at 866 (indicating that use of single witness for both
factual and expert witness suggests to jurors that information not heard in testimony nonethe-
less supports the conclusion of the witness).
249. See id. at 869.
250. See id.
251. Cf Walters v. State Road Dep't, 239 So. 2d 878, 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(maintaining that a basic rule of evidence in manyjurisdictions regards testimony that is essen-
tially speculative and conjectural as inadmissible).
252. SeeUnited States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 885 (1984) (striking testimony of a quali-
fied expert where he did not appraise the objects in question based on visual inspection of the
actual objects, but rather tried to appraise the objects in question based on visual inspection of
photographs, as such testimony lacked the requisite factual basis to assist the trier of fact).
253. See, e.g., Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
expert testimony that failure to adequately strip a tub as the cause of an accident to be mere
speculation and therefore inadmissible); Everett v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 949 F. Supp. 856, 858
(S.D. Ga. 1996) (excluding physician's testimony where opinion testimony is based on mere
speculation and therefore will not assist the trier of fact); Gilbert v. Summers, 393 S.E.2d 213,
215 (Va. 1990) (maintaining that expert opinion which is not based on facts, knowledge or
other evidence is speculative and has no evidentiary value).
254. See Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F. Supp. 606, 614-15 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that
professional engineer's testimony regarding an alternative seat belt design was inadmissible
because he presented no evidence to show alternative design was better than original
"defective" design); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 762 (E.D. Va. 1995) (excluding
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stances (i.e., "I know heroin when I see it, just because I do") is surely
far more speculative than that of many scientist's unproven hypothe-
ses.
When the police officer's identification testimony is the only evi-
dence offered as to the substance's identity, the jury is left to specu-
late as to one of the elements of the crime-whether the substance
possessed or distributed was in fact a controlled substance. This is
clearly a case of insufficient evidence.s 5 As a matter of law, the case
should not even go to the jury.26 An appellate court can not legiti-
mately affirm a conviction if the defendant could be as easily guilty as
innocent, and there is no reasonable way of determining which is
true. 7 By definition, such a case is one where the crime has not
been proven by a reasonable doubt.'
5. The justice system's interest in accuracy
Unmentioned until now has been the issue of cost. Chemical tests
are not free. There is, of course, no reason that the state be put to
the expense of testing a substance if there is no real question about
what it is. In most instances where there is no dispute that a sub-
stance is controlled, however, the defense will stipulate to that fact,
for in such cases there will be no strategic advantage to antagonizing
the prosecutor. The question of identification, then, will sometimes
arise in cases where there is no agreement on the nature of the sub-
stance, even though the substance is available. Could such a case be
expert testimony concluding that Retin-A use by a mother caused birth defects, in part because
no studies were published on the subject).
255. When evidence to prove an element of a crime is deemed insufficient on appeal, a
conviction must be reversed. See United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144-46 (10th Cir.
1997) (stating that evidence to support conviction must do more than raise mere suspicion of
guilt and thus reversing a conviction for possession of a handgun on ground of insufficient evi-
dence). Conviction solely on the basis of visual identification may well violate due process.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been interpreted to require that in a criminal conviction, the government must prove
each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeIn reWinship, 397 U.S. 358,
368 (1970) (holding that due process requires the government to prove each element of a
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, even in juvenile delinquency proceedings). Indeed, where
a reviewing court deems that evidence upon which a conviction was based was insufficient to
prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction shall be overturned. SeeJackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (deciding that federal habeas corpus relief should be
granted to state convicted applicants where the trial record shows "no rational trier of fact
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
256. See United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
a trial judge should not hand a case to a jury if evidence presented was so scant that jurors
would have to use speculation or conjecture to determine guilt).
257. See United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction
where evidence was speculative and thereby insufficient).
258. See id. at 556 (holding that convictions based on speculative evidence alone must be
overturned).
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tried without a definitive answer through a chemical test? Perhaps as
a matter of litigation strategy, both sides have an incentive to "play
chicken," to leave the matter unresolved to avoid creating evidence
which could be devastating to their case. If the lab finds the white
powder is baking soda, a defendant whom the prosecutor may
"know" is a drug dealer may have to be discharged. On the other
hand, evidence that the white powder is indeed cocaine could de-
stroy a particular defense strategy. Although it is easy to see why the
lawyers might not want a chemical test, it is harder to figure out why
the justice system should tolerate this kind of game-playing.
IV. THE WAR ON DRUGS
The disturbing trend in narcotics cases, identified here as the vis-
ual identification rule, begs explanation. Why would prosecutors in-
troduce baseless police testimony to prove an element of a crime in
their case in chief? Why have trial courts permitted irrational and
unreliable testimony by police officers to establish the identity of
controlled substances? Why have appellate courts nodded in ap-
proval of such practices? The answer to these questions may lie in
the substance of the offenses in question-i.e., these cases are sui
generis because they involve drugs.
United States policy toward illicit substances in the twentieth cen-
tury has been formulated under the perception that the "drug prob-
lem" constitutes a societal crisis warranting emergency measures in
response. During the 1980s, the nation's anti-drug efforts reached a
fever pitch in the 'Var on Drugs." The drastic intensification of drug
enforcement yielded increases in arrests and incarcerations for drug
offenses, but not without significant costs. The "emergency" of the
drug war served as justification for the rollback of constitutional pro-
tections. Further, increased volume in criminal drug arrests and
prosecutions, unaccompanied by proportionate increases in law en-
forcement and judicial resources, strained the criminal justice sys-
tem's capacity to process their caseloads. Given these circumstances,
the criminal justice system has been forced to improve efficiency in
drug prosecutions, possibly at the expense of the quality ofjustice for
drug offense defendants.
A. The History of the Drug War Emergency
The United States has sought to control the use and trade of drugs
since the adoption of the Harrison Act in 1914,2" which confined the
259. Harrison Act, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785.
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distribution of heroin and cocaine to physicians.263 Drug policy fo-
cused on public health issues until the 1920s when the Temperance
movement, in conjunction with "attitudes of nationalism, nativism,
fear of anarchy and of communism" shifted public perception to view
drug abuse as a national security threat .2 " This era saw the enact-
ment of the Volstead Act, enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment's
prohibition on alcohol, 262 and the establishment of the Federal Nar-
cotics Bureau.2 3 For the most part, however, the perception of drug
abuse as a national security threat subsided until a brief revival in the
McCarthy Era, culminating in the passage of the Narcotics Control
Act of 1956.26' During the 1960s, drug use became more common-
place among affluent white Americans.26 ' The government's ap-
proach to the drug problem during this decade was one of "benign
neglect., 26 6 Congress responded to the increased drug use of white
Americans with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,267 which mitigated the criminality associated with
drug use while simultaneously stiffening penalties for drug traffick-
ing. 68
Professor Steven Duke has noted that policy shifted in the 1970s
from benign neglect to the zealous "War on Drugs. 26 9 The first
"drug war" was inaugurated by President Richard Nixon in 1973 .
Nixon's drug war, however, was a mere skirmish in comparison to the
colossal efforts launched by the Reagan administration in the 1980s.
Formally announced by President Ronald Reagan in 1982,27 the War
260. See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 84-85 (1993).
261. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME, ANDJUSTICE SYSTEM: ANATIONAL
REPORT FROM THE BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTIcS 79 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 NATIONAL DRUG
REPORT].
262. Volstead Act, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
263. See 1992 NATIONAL DRUG REPORT, supra note 261, at 79.
264. See Narcotic Control Act of 1956, ch. 629, 70 Stat. 567.
265. See Ruth D. Peterson, Discriminatory Decision Making at the Legislative Level: An Analysis of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 9 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 243, 250
(1985) (suggesting that political crisis over drug use in the 1970's was a reaction to changing
patterns of drug use including increasing numbers of middle and upper class white youths).
266. See Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 574
(1995) (arguing that the "evils of drug prohibition would be drastically reduced" if the United
States returned to its pre-Nixon attitude of neglect toward illicit drug use).
267. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236.
268. See generally Peterson, supra note 265 (explaining the racial and economic rationale for
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
269. See Duke, supra note 266, at 574 (discussing Nixon's "all-out, global war on the drug
menace" (citing MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING RE.
ORGANIZATION PLAN No. 2 OF 1973, ESTABLISHING A DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
H.R. DOC. No. 93-69, at 3 (1973))).
270. See id.
271. See President's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249-50
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on Drugs was marked by deep public concern, bordering on hysteria,
toward the nation's drug problem. Under the leadership of Presi-
dent Reagan, the nation focused unprecedented energy and re-
sources towards eliminating illicit drug use and trafficking.7 In-
creases in drug enforcement, however, outpaced increases in
resources allocated to thejudiciary. 4
The drug war commanded bipartisan support. 5  Indeed, the at-
mosphere towards waging the drug war in Congress was one of com-
petition between the parties. The level of inter-party "one-ups-
manship" caused one Congressman to remark that "[e]ach member
and each committee and each party tried to outdo the other in its en-
thusiasm to wage the war against drugs. We should have been more
careful."276 The zeal and enthusiasm with which the War on Drugs
was waged, however, helped create a common perception that the
exigencies of the drug crisis necessitated the limited sacrifice of con-
stitutional protections from governmental intrusion on privacy and
due process of law. 7
The crisis mentality surrounding the drug war also was reflected in
the media attention given it. It is probable that the intense media at-
tention given to the drug war has had a significant impact on a de-
fendant's ability to receive a fair trial when charged with drug related
offenses. Certainly, prosecutors have recognized the value of media-
inspired public fervor over the drug war, evidenced by their invoca-
tion of drug war rhetoric during opening and closing argments.2 8
(1982) (announcing administration's new drug policy which combined efforts of different gov-
ernment agencies to provide structure in carrying out drug campaign).
272. See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context: Politics and Media in the Mak-
ing of a Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 535, 536 (1989) (describing the frenzy of politi-
cal and media attention that the "War on Drugs" received in the 1980s which consistently char-
acterized drug use in catastrophic proportions).
273. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC
POLICY 5-6 (1990).
274. See infra Part IV.B.2.
275. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 272, at 563-66 (asserting that drugs became a"hot"
issue for liberals and conservatives during the political campaigns of the 1980s, with both sides
using accusation that opponent was "soft on drugs").
276. See 132 CONG. REC. 22,666 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (expressing his dissatis-
faction with the bill's cost of roughly two billion dollars).
277. See Neal R. Sonnet, The War on Drugs-Or the Constitution?, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 27
(noting that sixty-two percent of persons contacted in poll said they would be "willing to give
up a few of the freedoms we have in this country if it meant we could greatly reduce the
amount of illegal drug use," including "warrantless searches of homes, random vehicle stops,
drug testing, and school locker searches" (citing Richard Morin, Many in Poll Say Bush Plan is
not Stringent Enough; Mandatory Drug Tests, Searches Backed, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al)).
278. See United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1157 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that prosecu-
tor's closing appeal to jurors invoking War on Drugs constituted a prejudicial remark and re-
versible error). But see United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1352-54 (11th Cir. 1984)
(finding that prosecutor's closing comments regarding narcotics cases and War on Drugs as an
analogy to invasion of United States shores did not constitute reversible error). See generally
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Indeed, media saturation during the drug war led Judge Abner J.
Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia to remark: "Frankly, I think it is getting harder and harder
for a defense lawyer to get a fair trial in a drug case."m The signifi-
cant impact that media attention has on public perception of social
issues, particularly in the case of the drug war, has inevitably affected
treatment by juries and courts of drug cases.2 °
B. Impact of the Drug War on the Judiciary
1. 'Drug exception" to the Bill of Rights
In addition to engendering sharp media attention and strong pub-
lic concern, the nation's increased efforts in the War on Drugs has
impacted the criminal justice system as a whole. The intensification
of the criminal justice effort has enlarged the volume of narcotics
cases processed, straining law enforcement as well as judicial re-
sources. The growing pressures on the criminal justice system
throughout the 1980s unfortunately have resulted in a diminution of
constitutional protections afforded to defendants.
Commentators such as Professors Steven Wisotsky and Paul
Finkelman have noted that one of the salient "casualties" of the War
on Drugs has been constitutional protections and civil liberties. 2 '
During the War on Drugs, law enforcement agencies developed new
and constitutionally questionable methods of detecting and appre-
Mark S. Davies, Comment, Enlisting the Jury in the "War on Drugs":" A Proposed Ban On Prosecutors'
Use of "War on Drugs" Rhetoric During Opening and Closing Argument of a Narcotics Trial, 1994 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 395, 397 (arguing that courts deem improper any "War on Drugs" rhetoric dur-
ing opening or dosing statements).
279. Selecting ImpartialJuries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search for Justice?, Panel One:
What Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for Impartial-
ity, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 547, 565 (1991) (remarks byJudge AbnerJ. Mikva, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia).
280. SeeJack C. Doppelt, Generic Preudice: How Drug War Fervor Threatens the Right to a Fair
Trial, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 821,835-36 (1991). Professor Doppelt concludes:
In this age of mass media, the crusading War on Drugs is a powerful rallying cry that
pierces a criminal justice system designed to ensure that each defendant receives a fair
trial.... Common sense should tell us that the daily drumbeat of the War on Drugs
might influence the way in which both jurors and judges dispense justice to a defen-
dant accused of a drug crime.... The challenge for the legal system is to ensure ge-
neric prejudice does not result in a brand of generic justice consumed by the passion
to win the War on Drugs.
Id.
281. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (1993) (observing that since the "War on Drugs" began, all branches of
government, both state and federal, have condoned a drug exception to the law); Steven Wisot-
sky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890
(1987) (noting that all three branches of government have used little effort to curb constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional limits on the exercise of governmental power when enforcing
drug laws).
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hending drug offenders.8 2 These new methods naturally invited con-
stitutional challenges on behalf of defendants. The tendency of the
judiciary, however, has been in favor of the law enforcement innova-S 283 i
tions-largely at the expense of constitutional protections. "[I] t is
almost as if a majority of the Court was hell-bent to seize any available
opportunity to define more expansively the constitutional authority
of law enforcement officials."
284
The Fourth Amendment 85 has been at the center of debate regard-
ing the limitations (or absence of limitations) on law enforcement
practices. 2  The impact of the drug war on the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure has
been dramatic.8 7 Intensified law enforcement efforts involving wire-
taps,2 8 as well as innovations in search and seizure such as police
saturation patrols and street sweeps,86 drug courier profiles,2 aerial
282. See Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1410 (noting that "[z]ealous law enforcement offi-
cials are inclined to stretch the limits of the Constitution in their desire to win the war" on
drugs). Some believe there has been an increase in police perjury which is connected to the
War on Drugs. See generally GabrielJ. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Science" as Evidence
of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998).
283. See FRANcIS A. ALLEN, HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINALJUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 41
(1996) ("The exigencies of drug-law enforcement have provided powerful motivations in the
ongoing erosion of constitutional protections against abuse by public agents in the administra-
tion of criminaljustice."). This trend, however, has not proceeded without vociferous criticism.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism
exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest."); Hartness v.
Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Edwards,J., dissenting).
Faced regularly with the grim results of the illegal drug trade, the judiciary may well
be tempted to offer aid to the government in its War on Drugs. But no matter how
pressing the perceived need, the judiciary is simply without authority to trim back the
Fourth Amendment. There is, and can be, no "drug exception" to the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted); United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 341 (1990) ("If this nation
were to win its 'War on Drugs' at the cost of sacrificing its citizens' constitutional rights, it
would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed.... Law enforcement officials are not licensed to disregard
the law-especially not the law enshrined in the Constitution.").
284. Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain
Iriew, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1222 (1983).
285. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
286. SeeWisotsky, supra note 281, at 907 (arguing that the assault on constitutional protec-
tions "reached its apogee in the realm of search and seizure").
287. As one author notes, "The sheer number of cases on this subject is overwhelming. A
comprehensive look at the drug war and Fourth Amendment law would require a book-length
study." Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1411.
288. SeeWisotsky, supra note 281, at 913-14.
289. See Adrienne L. Meiring, Walking the Constitutional Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications
of Police Use of Saturation Patrols and Roadblocks, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 500-01 (1993) (noting that
a "saturation patrol" involves law enforcement inundating a neighborhood targeted for its high
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surveillance," drug testing,2 thermal surveillance,' 5 and the demise
incidence of crime, greatly increasing police/citizen contact, and "vigorous[ly] enforc[ing] all
criminal and traffic laws, including minor misdemeanors" and Terry stops, in an effort to in-
crease detection); John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National
Purse, the Constitution, and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 613 n.233 (1991)
(noting that a "street sweep" occurs where law enforcement personnel round up all individuals
on a given block and conduct searches and questioning).
290. A "drug courier profile" is a list of characteristics likely to be possessed by a drug traf-
ficker, used by law enforcement to initiate stops. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494 n.2
(1983).
In United States v. Sokolow, the Supreme Court upheld a search based on a drug courier pro-
file where the characteristics under the profile satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirements
under the "totality of factors" test. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1989). In his
dissent, Justice Marshall remarked that the holding in Sokolow demonstrated the Court's
"willingness when drug crimes or antidrug policies are at issue, to give short shrift to constitu-
tional rights." Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing his own dissent in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 636 (1989) (Marshall,J, dissenting)). For further discus-
sion of the implications of Sokolow, see generally Steven K. Bernstein, Fourth Amendment Using
the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996 (1990);
Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1423-26; Michael J. Mills, Note, Reasonable Suspicion and the Fourth
Amendment: United States v. Sokolow, 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 45 (1989-90);Jodi Sax, Note, Drug
Courier Profiles, Airport Stops and the Inherent Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
After United States v. Sokolow, 25 Loy. LA L. REv. 321 (1991).
291. In F/orida v. Riley, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless observation of the inte-
rior of an enclosed greenhouse with a helicopter. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
In his dissentJustice Brennan commented on the effect of the holding in Riley: "The question
is not whether you or I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I
must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveil-
lance if we do not." Id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Per-
spectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403 (1974)). For a further discussion of
the implications of Riley, see DavidJ. Stewart, Recent Development, Florida v. Riley: TheEmerging
StandardforAerialSurveillanceofthe Curtilage, 43VAND. L. REV. 275 (1990);John R. Dixon, Note,
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Open View Doctrine: Florida v. Riley, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
157 (1989);Jon Gavenman, Comment, Florida v. Riley: The Descent of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tions in Aerial Surveillance Cases, 17 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 725 (1990); Daniel R. Hansen, Note,
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and Florida v. Riley: The Loss of Liberty, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 407;
Gregory E. Sopkin, Comment, The Police Have Become Our Nosy Neighbor: Florida v. Riley and
Other Supreme Court Deviations from Katz, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 407 (1991).
292. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (holding random uri-
nalysis requirement for student participation in athletics constitutional). For the implications
of Vernonia, see generally Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1411, n.149; Kevin C. Newsom, Suspi-
cionless Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 209 (1995); Christopher S. Hagge, Note, Vernonia School District 47J v. Ac-
ton: The Demise of Individualized Suspicion in Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures, 31 TULSA L.J.
559 (1996); C. Lane Mears, Casenote, Another Slice of the Right to Privacy Pie: Do Public Schoolchil-
dren Maintain Any Fourth Amendment Rights AfterVernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995), 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 591 (1996); Samantha Osheroff, Note, Drug Testing of Student Athletes
in Vemonia School District v. Acton: Orwell's 1984 Becomes Vernonia's Reality in 1995, 16 LOY.
LA ENT. L.J. 513 (1995);Joaquin G. Padilla, Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton:
Flushing the Fourth Amendment-Student Athletes'Privacy Interests Go Down the Drain, 73 DENV. U. L.
REv. 571 (1996).
293. Thermal surveillance is current law enforcement heat detecting technology that per-
mits police to gain information as to the contents of residences. See United States v. Robinson,
62 F.3d 1325, 1328 n.2 (1lth Cir. 1995). For cases upholding warrantless thermal surveillance,
see United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992
(11th Cir. 1994). For a thorough discussion ofjurisprudence regarding the constitutional va-
lidity of thermal surveillance as used by law enforcement officers, see Lisa Tuenge Hale, United
States v. Ford: The Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on Private
Property Without a Warrant, 29 GA. L. REV. 819 (1995); M. Annette Lanning, Note, Thermal Sur-
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of the "knock and announce" rule,2 all justified by the exigencies of
the War on Drugs, have significantly encroached on Fourth Amend-
ment protections of personal privacy.
In addition to expanding governmental search and seizure meth-
ods at the expense of privacy rights, the drug war has encroached
upon due process rights,' 5 most notably in the area of civil forfei-
ture." Initially, during the 1970s, courts were divided as to whether
a defendant must be given notice and a hearing prior to civil forfei-
ture proceedings. 7 At the height of the drug war, however, courts
shifted toward overwhelming approval of governmental civil forfei-
ture practices without notice.28 It was not until the 1993 Supreme
veillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771
(1996); Michael D. O'Mara, Comment, Thermal Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: Heating
Up the War On Drugs, 100 DICK L. REV. 415,417-24 (1996); Matthew L. Zabel, Comment,A High-
Tech Assault on the "Castle': Warrantless Thermal Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth
Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 267 (1995).
294. The common law knock and announce rule, elevated to a constitutional right by the
Supreme Court in Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), requires that police officers executing a
search warrant first knock and identify themselves, state the purpose for demanding entry, and
allow time for the door to be opened before forcibly entering. See id. at 40-41. Several courts
have adopted a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in narcotics cases due to the
risk that evidence will be disposed of before the police obtain entry. See United States v. Ken-
nedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8th Cir.
1992). The United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Wilson v. Arkansas that the pre-
vious knock and announce requirement is only one of several requirements to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of the search. SeeWilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918-
19 (1995).
In 1997, however, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a
blanket exception to the knock and announce rule for drug investigations. See Richards v. Wis-
consin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422 (1997). For a discussion of the demise of the knock and an-
nounce rule, seeJohn C. Barnoski, Casenote, Common Law "Knock and Announce"Principle Forms
Part of Reasonableness Inquiry Under Fourth Amendment-Wilson v. Arkansas, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 1231 (1996); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New
Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1993);Jennifer Goddard,
Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule: A Call for Protection of
Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REv. 449 (1995).
295. See Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1431 (arguing that the government's claim of neces-
sity is a threat to a citizen's fundamental due process rights).
296. The 1984 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, amending Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236
(1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994)), permits the government to confiscate
all property derived from or used in any manner in violation of federal drug law. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e) (1994). Under the Act, the government may also obtain, prior to conviction, a protec-
tive order preventing a defendant from possessing any property that might be subject to sei-
zure. See 21 U.S.C.§ 853(c) (1994).
For a discussion of the disproportionate impact that civil forfeiture practices associated with
drug enforcement has had on the poor, see Jack Yoskowitz, The War on the Poor: CivilForfeiture
of Public Housing, 25 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 567 (1992).
297. See Sally R. Weist, Note, Civil Drug Forfeitures AfterJames Daniel Good Real Property:
Preseizure Notice and Hearing Do Not Weaken the Powerful Weapon in "The War on Drugs, "4 WIDENER
J. Pu B. L. 663, 679-83 (1995) (discussing lower court split on whether pre-seizure notice was
required).
298. See id. at 682. One commentator noted: "For many years, the government ha[s] en-
joyed almost unanimous favorable rulings on any and every issue raised in a federal civil forfei-
ture case." Id. at 682 n. 101 (quoting Robert M. Sondak, The Mysterious Civil Forfeiture Law, FLA.
B.J., Mar. 1994, at 25).
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Court case United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,2 that a de-
fendant was guaranteed notice and a hearing prior to governmental
seizure of real property."' Forfeiture also created problems regard-
ing the quality of the defendant's legal representation.s"' Forfeiture
or freezing of a defendant's assets could force the defendant to rely
on appointed counsel. 02 As a consequence, public defenders have
increased caseloads and make it less liely that clients will receive satis-
factory representation.3
The drug war has served as the catalyst for other civil innovations
designed to deter the drug trade that also incidentally inhibit consti-
tutional protections. For instance, almost half of the states have re-
vived depression era civil taxes on controlled substances.3 The tax
on controlled substances impinges upon constitutional rights by re-
quiring that persons in possession of taxable substances report and
pay assessments on their holdings of drugs.3 °5 By requiring self-
reporting to the tax authorities, these state laws have essentially re-
quired that persons in possession of drugs incriminate themselves-
in violation of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 6
2. Strain on judicial resources
In addition to the drug war's impact on constitutional protections,
the expansion of drug enforcement activity has significantly impacted
judicial and criminal justice resources. As a result of the nation's in-
creased efforts in drug enforcement, arrest and incarceration rates
for drug offenses rose dramatically, seriously taxing law enforcement
and judicial resources.3 7 Between 1980 and 1993, the total number
299. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
300. See id. For commentary on James Daniel see Tony M. Franzese-Damron, Note, United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property: Pre-Hearing Seizure of Real Property in Civil Forfeiture
Cases and the 1993 Trilogy of Restraint, 1994 DET. C. L. REV. 1293; Peter W. Salsich, III, Note, A
Delicate Balance: Making Criminal Forfeiture a Viable Law Enforcement Tool and Satisfying Due Process
After United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 585 (1995); Weist,
supra note 297, at 663.
301. SeeFinkelman, supra note 281, at 1444-45.
302. The forfeiture of attorney's fees in particular "threaten [s] the future of an independ-
ent criminal defense bar, ignore[s] the constitutional presumption of innocence, and de-
prive[s] accused persons of the constitutional right to retain defense counsel of their choice."
Neal L Sonnett, War on Drugs--Or the Constitution?, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 24.
303. See Finkelman, supra note 281, at 1444 (describing ways in which prosecutors can pre-
vent criminal defendants from securing adequate counsel).
304. Ann L. Iijima, The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Falls Victim to
State Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 101, 101-02 n.2 (1994).
305. See id. at 102 n.2.
306. For a thorough discussion of the impact on the privilege against self incrimination
caused by controlled substance taxes, see generally id.
307. For a thorough discussion of the impact of increased drug enforcement efforts on law
enforcement, see DAVID W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A
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of criminal case filings per year in federal court increased by seventy
percent, yet the total number of authorized judgeships failed to in-
crease proportionately." The increase in criminal caseloads can be
explained by the increase in drug enforcement. Indeed, the average
number of drug filings per year almost quadrupled during the 1980s
and early 1990s." Congress has failed, however, to appropriate re-
sources proportionate to the increase in the judiciary's workload.1 °
As a result, the quality ofjustice has been adversely affected.31
The problem is exacerbated by the increase in prosecutions result-
ing in jury trials as a result of mandatory minimum sentences. 2
While eighty-five to ninety percent of federal criminal cases were his-
torically resolved through plea bargains, 3 drug defendants facing
lengthy mandatory minimum prison sentences have little incentive to
deal. 4
Overwhelming caseloads, in large part due to the drug war, have
thus led to the adoption of innovative and novel judicial processing
of drug cases. For instance, federal prosecutors have succeeded in
DRUG WAR: CRIMINALJUSTICE IN THE COMMONS (1994). For a discussion of the impact of in-
creased drug enforcement efforts on the federal judiciary, see Kim Dayton,Judicial Vacancies
and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 757 (1993); Patrick
E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Triab Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 663,
672-73 (1993). Dayton remarks:
There is no question that the War on Drugs has had an impact on the federal courts:
the number of criminal drug prosecutions (felony and misdemeanor) has more than
tripled since 1981, and the number of criminal defendants prosecuted per felony case
has increased in recent years as well. There were 8925 criminal trials (felony and mis-
demeanor) in the federal courts in 1991, compared to 6542 in 1981, and there has
been a substantial increase in the number of lengthy criminal trials. In addition, be-
cause of the Speedy Trial Act and the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
which require that criminal cases be handled relatively expeditiously, these heavy
caseloads have consumed a substantial share of many courts' judicial resources. Man-
datory minimum sentences for many drug offenses and the peculiarities of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines have both decreased the incentives to plead guilty, and
greatly complicated the sentencing process, consuming more judicial resources ....
Id. at 762-63 (citations omitted).
308. See Longan, supra note 307, at 672.
309. See id. at 672-73.
310. See Patrick E. Longan, Faces of Washington: The Budget Crises and the Courts, 43 FED. LAW.
26, 27-28 (1996). Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil and criminal
matters over the last few years, but has repeatedly short-changed the judiciary in the budget.
See id.
311. See id. at 28 ("Congress has caused a deterioration in the quality ofjustice rendered in
the federal courts simply by giving the courts too much to do.") (citation omitted); see also
Honorable Vaughn P. Walker, Federalizing Organized Crime, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1127, 1154 (1995)
("When courts are compelled to absorb so much so quickly, what would otherwise be ripple
effects become major dislocations.").
312. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM (1991).
313. SeeWalker, supra note 311, at 1155 n.130 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, A Report from the
Front in the War on Drugs, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1990)).
314. Seeid.at 1155.
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consistently relying on single hearsay witnesses in grand jury proceed-
ings involving drug offenses in the face of challenges of prosecutorial
misconduct.15 Although courts have proceeded with caution in af-
firming such cases, they have proceeded nonetheless. Recognizing
that "the single-witness policy provides an efficient means of obtain-
ing indictments in our overcrowded criminal justice system," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cautioned that
"we must be wary that we do not exalt expedience at the expense of
fundamental fairness.01 6 Nevertheless, despite these warnings, the
end result has been to permit the single-witness.
Federal prosecutors also have attempted (and failed) to expand ju-
risdiction in drug related in rem civil forfeiture cases so that service
of process may issue beyond the jurisdiction of the district court. 1 7
The government based its arguments on legislative history from a
criminal forfeiture statute founded on conserving "valuable judicial
and law enforcement resources" in light of the "unmanageable" back-
log of civil forfeiture drug cases.31 8
States also have responded to the strain on resources posed by the
drug war. In an effort to deal more efficiently with New Jersey's
"sudden and tremendous surge in case filings" attributable to the
drug war, the New Jersey Legislature, for instance, has pioneered
numerous innovations to improve judicial and prosecutorial effi-
ciencyY. Similarly, the New York judiciary has attempted to consoli-
date its narcotics cases in New York City with the creation of the
"Supreme Court, Part N" of New York County, with jurisdiction ex-
clusively over narcotics matters."o
The strain on resources has generated changes in minimum evi-
dentiary requisites in narcotics cases as well, particularly in the identi-
fication of controlled substances. To alleviate the burden of requir-
ing in court testimony of the states' chemists who test controlled
substances at issue to determine their identity, several states statuto-
315. See United States v. Al Fenton, 755 F. Supp. 72, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (refusing to find
prosecutorial misconduct in the absence of a pattern of abuse).
316. SeeUnited States v. Brito, 907 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1990).
317. See United States v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143 at Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 982 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Contents of
Accounts] (denying government's proposal to read nationwide service of process into 21 U.S.C.
981 (h)); seealso United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, Roswell, New Mexico, 17 F.3d 1306,
1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (again denying government's proposal of nationwide service in 21 U.S.C.
981 (h) here involving real property in New Mexico alleged to be part of a money laundering
scheme).
318. See Contents of Accounts, 971 F.2d at 981.
319. See State v. Shaw, 618 A.2d 294, 300 (N.J. 1993) (discussing legislative response to drug
war).
320. SeeN.Y.JUD. LAw§ 177(a)-(e) (McKinney 1990).
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rily permit that a certified copy of the laboratory report serve as
competent evidence of the identity of the substance.32' States also
have attempted to expedite drug case processing by statutorily lower-
ing the minimum evidentiary proof required at preliminary hear-
ings.m
Efficiency in drug identification has also been improved by courts
permitting chemists to infer the identity of an aggregate of sub-
stances from tests of a sample of the substance, rather than a test of
the entire quantity. For example, where 100 alleged methaqualone
tablets are confiscated, an Illinois appellate court affirmed a ruling
allowing a chemist to infer the identity of the 100 tablets by testing
three randomly drawn samples."
In sum, the cumulative effects of the War on Drugs have had sig-
nificant consequences for the administration of justice in narcotics
cases. The recession of constitutional liberties, coupled with the in-
creased strain on judicial and law enforcement resources, com-
pounded by heightened media attention, has created an atmosphere
in which courts are more likely to risk violations of a criminal defen-
dant's substantive and procedural rights in narcotics cases. The con-
stitutional atmosphere is inevitably pertinent to courts' evidentiary
determinations in cases of police visual identification testimony.
The drug war likewise has impacted the administration ofjustice at
the micro-level in narcotics prosecutions. The most recent manifes-
tation of such effects, however, is in evidentiary rulings-those re-
garding the visual identification of narcotic substances. As demon-
strated, the evidentiary standards of admissibility for both expert and
321. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-556 (1996); IDAHO
CODE § 37-2745 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-37 (1995 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 475.235(3) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.680 (West 1996).
322. The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services noted that a 1991 law passed in
the state legislature expedited case processing in light of the backlog in the crime laboratory by
permitting officers to present the results of field tests at preliminary hearings. See DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINALJUSTICE SERVICES, DRUGS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRIMINALJUSTICE PERSPECTIVE 45
(1991).
323. See People v. Kaludis, 497 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ill. App. 1986). The establishment of the
identity of a controlled substance via random sampling is limited, however, to those cases
where the aggregate quantity of substances is sufficiently homogenous to the naked eye. See
People v. Ayala, 422 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. App. 1981). Thus, where the evidence consists of two
bags of white powder, as a matter of law, a conclusive test for heroin of one bag fails to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the other bag also contains heroin. See id.; see also Ross v. State,
528 So. 2d 1237, 1239-40 (Fla. App. 1988) (finding chemical test of two out of ninety-two pack-
ets of powder insufficient to prove the content of remaining packets although all packets were
found in one paper bag and all packets looked alike); People v. Maiden, 569 N.E.2d 120, 125
(Ill. App. 1991) (finding chemist test of one out of three bottles of alleged PCP insufficient to
prove content of remaining bottles as a matter of law). Notably, the rule against inferring the
identity of one bag of powdered substance from a test of another bag that looks similar bears
directly on whether an officer may visually identify a powder substance. See supra Part II.C.
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lay opinion testimony have undergone a transition in recent years.
In addition to liberalizing the standards of admissibility for such evi-
dence, this transition has been accompanied by a substantial degree
of confusion as to how the rules are applied. As such, the rules of
evidence regarding narcotics identification were an unlikely mecha-
nism by which the systemic pressures of the drug war could be re-
pelled. The visual identification rule is a direct result of that failure.
CONCLUSION: ARE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE THE NEXT CASUALTY OF
THE WAR ON DRUGS?
In recent years, the nation has pursued criminal narcotics en-
forcement in the context of a War on Drugs-emergency measures
adapted to meet perceived emergency circumstances. This drug war
policy has resulted in the circumscription of constitutional protec-
tions and has imposed severe pressures on judicial and law enforce-
ment resources. The past few years also have seen the transformation
of evidentiary standards of admissibility, due in large part to the
widespread adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Particularly
in the area of lay opinion and expert testimony, these rules have
caused greater flexibility and leniency in admitting such evidence.
This combination of systemic drug war pressures and the liberalizing
of Federal Rules of Evidence threaten evidentiary standards in the in-
terests of expediting a prosecution.
Coinciding with the drug war, a few courts have developed the vis-
ual identification rule. Careful analysis, however, reveals that the vis-
ual identification rule fails even the most liberal reading of the rules
of evidence. In a word, police officers possess absolutely no creden-
tials which might permit them to rationally infer the identity of a
white powdered substance by simply looking at it. Unlike the case of
marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and other powdered substances possess
no physical attributes which reveal identity. The visual identification
rule violates constitutional due process if such testimony is exclusively
relied upon to prove the identity of the substance. Such testimony
fails requisites of evidentiary reliability, is without probative value,
and, coming from the mouth of a police officer, is quite prejudicial,
potentially suggesting to the jury that "he knows something they
don't." Further, the large risk of error in a visual identification may
have extreme consequences for the defendant, given that lesser pen-
alties may be associated with different drugs or imitation controlled
substances.
This Article also has demonstrated that the longstanding rule hold-
ing circumstantial evidence of a substance's identity to be sufficient
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should be rescinded. In light of the pervasive traffic in imitation con-
trolled substances, the risk that the substance at hand was an imita-
tion substance carrying lesser penalties for violations is great. Al-
though such evidence ought to be admitted to demonstrate that the
circumstances were "consistent with" a particular substance, such evi-
dence alone can only in rare circumstances be held sufficient114 The
prosecution should be required to secure a stipulation of the identity
of the substance from defense counsel in cases where, in their discre-
tion, the government chooses not to test a particular substance.
Irrespective of the connection between the drug war and the visual
identification rule, the emerging practice of police officer opinion
testimony about the identity of indescript chemical substances should
be cause for alarm. From society's perspective, there is a substantial
interest in requiring that the police and prosecution establish every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. From ajurispruden-
tial perspective, the value of expert opinion testimony must be pro-
tected from the devaluation that may occur by eliminating standards
of admissibility for opinion testimony.
In addition to offending the rules of evidence, admitting police
visual identification evidence risks the dilution of evidentiary stan-
dards outside the context of criminal drug prosecutions. If a court
may admit visual identification testimony by police concerning nar-
cotics, why not admit similarly unfounded expert opinion in other
types of criminal cases? Why not in civil litigation? Without careful
attention, the effects of the emergency of the War on Drugs on the
rules of evidence may indeed spillover and distort litigation in gen-
eral.
324. For instance, where the substance cannot be tested because of actions of the defendant
(i.e., the substance was disposed of), circumstantial evidence, by necessity, may be sufficient.
See Unites States v. Wright, 16 F.d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The identity of a drug may be
ascertained by circumstantial evidence .... " (citing United States v. Schrock, 885 F.2d 327, 334
(6th Cir. 1984))).

